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I examine the asymmetric impact of positive and negative information on stock return 
synchronicity that occurs from a change in short-sale constraints. Using a unique Chinese 
dataset that segments the trading activity of individual and institutional investors, I am 
able to observe each investor group’s relative preference for incorporating firm-level as 
opposed to market-level negative information. My results show the existence of an 
asymmetric impact. Moreover, institutional (individual) traders impound more firm-
specific (market-wide) negative information relative to market-wide (firm-specific) 
negative information when they are allowed to short-sell. These findings suggest that the 
sentiment of the information that is being released plays a significant role in determining 
the level of stock return synchronicity. The extent to which firm-specific negative 
information is impounded into prices because of the change of short-sale constraints 
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1 Introduction  
Stock returns are driven by new information at both the market and firm level. The extent 
to which the amount of firm-specific, as opposed to market-wide, information that 
explains price changes bears important implications for investors. Roll (1988) proposes 
a measure named return synchronicity to capture such a relationship. Following Roll 
(1988), a growing body of research has investigated return synchronicity across firms and 
countries in an effort to find out the reasons for return synchronicity differences.  
Factors addressed in the literature include, but are not limited to, the investment 
environment at the country level (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Jin and Myers, 2006; 
Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008, 2009; Kim and Shi, 2010; Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang, 
2015), firm-level information environment (e.g., Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 
2003; Veldkamp, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; 
Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao, 2010; Chan, Hameed, and Kang, 2013; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 
2013; Kelly, 2014), and investor type (e.g., Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015). Empirical findings suggest that 
markets with stronger trading protection, firms with a more transparent information 
environment, or firms dominated by institutional investors would encourage more 
incorporation of firm specific information. Although these external factors that affect 
return synchronicity have been well documented, relatively little is known about the 
information per se (i.e., good versus bad news). The literature shows strong evidence 
towards the asymmetric impact of positive and negative news on stock returns (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan, 1998; Biais, Bisiere, 




motivates me to investigate the potential influence of positive and negative news on stock 
return synchronicity.  
In discussion of the asymmetric impact of positive and negative news on stock returns, 
prior literature shows that investors respond more to bad news than to good news (e.g., 
Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Chan, 2003; Tetlock, 2007; Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki, 2009; Truong, 2011; García, 2013). However, these studies do not consider 
possible limitations on selling stocks. Unlike positive information, where investors can 
buy stocks at any time, reacting to negative news is restricted by selling existing stocks 
if short selling is not permitted. Moreover, even if short selling is permissible, investors’ 
ability to short-sell may be restricted by a lack of sufficient capital1, the recall risk2, or 
the high search cost to find a stock lender in non-centralized short-selling markets3. In 
addition, individual investors are bound more by such restrictions since they are 
confronted with less capital and higher searching costs than institutional investors. 
Empirically, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that about 75% of all short sales 
are executed by institutions, whereas individuals’ trading occupies less than 2%. These 
real-world trading obstacles motivates me to investigate the impact of short-sale 
constraints on return synchronicity and associate it with investor type. By doing so, I aim 
to fill the gap in the literature by providing a deeper understanding of how positive and 
negative information leads to different types of investor response in incorporating firm-
level information.  
The primary objective of this research is to investigate any asymmetric impact of positive 
and negative information on the stock return synchronicity that occurs from a change in 
                                                 
1 Investors need sufficient capital to cover the loss before they make a profit. 
2 The recall risk refers to the lender having the right to request the return of stocks at any time before 
making money. 
3 In non-centralized shorting markets, finding a lender takes longer and costs more, making it even more 




short-sale constraints. Specifically, I formulate the following hypotheses. First, I posit 
that, with the relaxation of short-sale constraints, investors are offered more opportunities 
to impound negative information and thus result in a return synchronicity difference 
between shortable and non-shortable shares. Second, this study aims to contrast the 
abilities of institutional and individual investors in impounding negative information into 
the stock price. Given that institutional investors have a greater ability to execute short-
sale orders, I presume a relatively larger synchronicity difference between shortable and 
non-shortable shares in markets dominated by institutional investors. Third, although the 
lifting of short-sale constraints is expected to facilitate the flow of negative information 
at both market and firm level, the facilitation of certain types of negative information may 
depend on investor type. Institutional (individual) investors trade relatively more on firm-
specific (market-wide) information (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). Therefore, when 
they are allowed to short sell, I conjecture that institutional (individual) investors tend to 
incorporate more firm-specific (market-wide) negative information. In other words, the 
return synchronicity of shortable shares is relatively higher (lower) than non-shortable 
shares in markets where individual investors (institutional investors) dominate. Fourth, a 
better corporate governance structure encourages better information disclosure that 
results in investors’ higher willingness to incorporate the information (e.g., Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005; Gul, Kim and Qiu, 2010; Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen, 2012; 
Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015). I will test how a better corporate governance 





I examine my objectives using A- and H- dual listed shares4 under China’s unique capital 
market framework for the following reasons. First, these dual-listed stocks are one 
company traded in two economic zones (i.e., mainland China and Hong Kong) in one 
country. They have the same firm characteristics and firm-level information. This 
provides better controls when making a comparison. Second, only certain shares on the 
designated list can be short-sold in both the A- and H-share markets. The designated lists 
are different in the two markets and are regularly updated. This semi-open access to short-
sales allows me to compare shortable and non-shortable shares in a single market. Third, 
the mainland Chinese stock market is dominated by Chinese citizens (tilted individual 
investors) but the majority of investors in Hong Kong are from Hong Kong and other 
countries (tilted institutional investors) (HKEx, 2016). This segmentation allows me to 
observe institutional and individual investors’ different responses to positive and negative 
information. I collect a sample of 86 companies that are incorporated in mainland China 
and traded simultaneously on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(A-shares) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-shares). The sample period is January 
2005 to December 2014. This period includes a change of short-sale regulations on the 
mainland Chinese market beginning March 2010. Using the accounting and financial data 
from DataStream and CSMAR, I construct a measure of firm-specific information based 
on stock return synchronicity. In detail, I gauge the firm-specific information 
incorporation using the R2 obtained from the regression of the daily individual stock 
returns on the daily market returns. I collect the news data from Thomson Reuters News 
Analytics (TRNA) and obtain corporate governance data from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR).  
                                                 
4 A-shares are shares issued on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). H-




The empirical results show that short-sale constraints result in a significantly different 
level of return synchronicity. The magnitude of the difference in the H-share market is 
larger than the A-share market. Specifically, shortable A- (H-) shares present higher 
(lower) return synchronicity than non-shortable shares. My interpretation of these results 
is that when individual investors are allowed to short sell, they trade on market-wide 
negative information. In contrast, institutional investors trade on firm-specific negative 
information.  
The second set of empirical results is generated from a series of robustness tests to support 
my interpretation above. First, I test the change of liquidity commonality due to the 
relaxation of short-sale constraints. The literature suggests that liquidity commonality is 
higher in markets with more correlated trading (e.g., Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; 
Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2009) or more noisy traders (Huberman and Halka, 2001). 
Given that individual investors trade on market-wide negative information whereas 
institutional investors prefer to trade on firm-specific negative information, correlated 
trading can arise from trading on the same piece of information. In addition, Foucault, 
Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) suggest that individual investors are considered noisy or 
speculative. I expect that the shortable A- (H-) shares present higher (lower) liquidity 
commonality than non-shortable A- (H-) shares. Next, I conduct tests to observe 
separately trading volumes on days with market-wide news and firm-specific news. I rely 
on a news data set provided by Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA) to collect the 
real-time news releases at the firm level from 2005 to 2014. TRNA not only records all 
news articles attached to each firm but also quantifies the sentiment (i.e., positive or 
negative) and the relevance (i.e., to what extent a news item is related to a company) 
based on professional algorithms. My previous findings suggest that individual 




Therefore, on days with market-wide negative news, I expect an increase of trading 
volumes for stocks that are allowed to short-sell in the A-share market. On days with 
firm-specific negative information, I expect larger trading volumes of H-shares than their 
dual-listed A-shares. The empirical results broadly confirm my expectation. They show 
a significantly higher (lower) liquidity commonality among shortable shares than non-
shortable shares in the A-share (H-share) market. The shortable A-shares’ trading 
volumes are significantly higher than non-shortable shares on days with market-wide 
negative news. On days with firm-specific negative information, H-shares’ trading 
volumes are higher than their counterparts in the A-share market. All this evidence 
supports my primary expectation that positive and negative information have an 
asymmetric influence on return synchronicity. More interestingly, with the lifting of 
short-sale constraints, institutional investors in the H-share market incorporate more firm-
specific negative information into prices. However, individual investors in the A-share 
market rely on market-wide negative information when they trade. 
The last set of the tests incorporates the role that corporate governance plays in explaining 
the impact of short-sale constraints on return synchronicity. Good corporate governance 
leads to high quality information disclosure that then improves firm transparency 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen, 2012). I expect that 
stronger (weaker) corporate governance increases (decreases) institutional investors’ 
willingness to process firm-specific negative information and amplifies (mitigates) the 
asymmetric impact on the H-share market. I would expect no significant impact on the 
A-share market since individual traders rely on market-wide negative information. The 
empirical results show weak evidence on the importance of corporate governance but, to 
some extent, it supports my hypothesis. For instance, the dual roles of CEO and chairman 




information. Therefore, the return synchronicity disparity between the shortable and non-
shortable shares is lessened.  
In summary, my empirical results confirm the existence of the asymmetric impact of 
positive and negative news on return synchronicity. Institutional investors have a stronger 
capability to deal with firm specific information than individual investors. In particular, 
institutional (individual) investors trade more on firm-specific (market-wide) negative 
information when short-sale constraints are relaxed. In the robustness tests, I find that 
shortable shares show higher (lower) liquidity commonality on the A-share (H-share) 
market. The trading volumes of shortable A-shares are larger than non-shortable A-shares 
on days with market-wide negative information. The trading volumes of H-shares are 
larger than A-shares on days with firm-specific negative information. All this empirical 
evidence further supports my primary findings. Finally, in general, a better corporate 
governance environment has weak power to amplify this asymmetric impact. The dual 
role of CEO and chairman provides evidence of mitigation of the asymmetry effect in the 
H-share market.  
This study contributes to the existing literature as detailed below. First, my research 
advances our understanding in previous return synchronicity literature by incorporating 
the impact of information per se (positive versus negative news sentiment). Second, my 
research findings provide additional evidence to support the view that return 
synchronicity is inversely related to the level of firm-specific information. Third, by using 
data from the Chinese market that separates the institutional and individual investors, I 
show institutional and individual investors’ different trading preferences towards firm-
specific as opposed to market-wide information when they are able to short-sell. In 
addition, the study provides several implications for capital market regulators. It is 




conditions. In markets with a larger proportion of individual investors, relaxation of 
short-sale constraints may lead to greater correlated trading or noisy trading. That is, 
individual investors overly concentrate on the market recession and overlook stocks with 
good firm-specific information, which might not serve the purpose of improving market 
efficiency. Alternatively, regulators could encourage more participation of institutional 
investors in the mainland Chinese market to facilitate incorporation of firm-specific 
negative information.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I provide the 
background discussion for the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong markets. In chapter 3, 
I discuss related research. In chapter 4, I develop the hypotheses. In chapter 5, I describe 
my data sources and methodology. In chapter 6, I present the empirical results and discuss 
























This chapter provides a brief introduction to the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges. The first section discusses their history and provides a statistical overview. 
The second section points out the differences between the two stock markets such as 
trader type, trading rules and corporate governance. The third section introduces the price 
premium puzzle on cross-listed A- and H-shares.  
 
2.1 The development and features of the mainland Chinese 
and Hong Kong stock exchanges 
Until the late 1970s, China remained a centrally controlled economy with all economic 
activities and investment decisions planned and controlled by the government. Since the 
1980s, the Chinese government has tried various strategies to transform the central 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy. One of the most influential strategies 
was the restructuring of state owned enterprises (SOEs). Limited by the capacity of 
government funding, SOEs have to raise capital from the public to support their 
operations and expansion. To facilitate this process, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established (Jiang, Yue, and Zhao, 2009). 
SSE was set up on 19 December 1990 and SZSE followed on 3 July 1991. At the end of 
2014, 2613 companies were listed on these two exchanges. 
A firm incorporated in mainland China has the option to issue five types of share to the 
domestic market. They are state shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-shares 
and B-shares. State shares are held by government agencies such as local finance bureaus. 




shares are held by domestic companies or non-individual legal persons. They can also be 
held by the government through legal person entities. Only the last two types of shares 
(A-shares and B-shares) are freely tradable. A-shares are ordinary shares issued to 
residents of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFII). To qualify for an Initial Public Offering (IPO), companies are required 
to issue at least 25% of their total outstanding shares as tradable A-shares. B-shares have 
been available to foreign investors since 1992. Companies can choose to list their B-
shares on either of the two national stock exchanges, SSE or SZSE. Given that China’s 
renminbi (RMB) is not freely convertible, B-shares are traded in either US dollars on SSE 
or HK dollars on SZSE. B-shares were originally available only to foreign investors. 
Since February 2001, they have also been available to Chinese citizens if they have the 
required foreign currency. Before 2005, about two-thirds of the shares were not tradable 
because of government control. This strict separation between the tradable and non-
tradable shares was re-structured in April, 2005, through the split share reform. It started 
with a pilot program with four listed firms and gradually expanded to almost all listed 
firms by the end of 2007. This reform reorganised companies as limited liability 
corporations with more freely tradable shares and profit-oriented objectives. 
Attracted by China’s economic growth potential, there has been an increasing demand 
from international traders to invest in Chinese companies. To make this happen, the 
Chinese government issued its first regulations on overseas listing on April 19, 1993. 
Because of the advantages of language, location, and political connections, the Hong 
Kong market became the preferred place for overseas listing. Hong Kong Exchanges and 
Clearing Limited (HKEx) developed from the merger of the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong Limited (SEHK), Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited (HKFE) and Hong Kong 




core markets: a securities market5, derivatives market and industrial metal market. Shares 
listed on the Hong Kong market (H-shares) offer investors from Hong Kong or other 
countries opportunities to invest in the Chinese market without the various eligibility and 
currency restrictions. Three months after the release of the oversea listing regulations, 
Tsingtao Brewery became the first H-share listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. To 
gain a larger financing base, many H-shares chose to list back on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Apart from H-shares, some shares are state-backed 
companies incorporated outside mainland China and listed on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange through a direct IPO or backdoor listing6. These companies are usually big, 
powerful and diversified conglomerates. They are known as red chips because they 
usually represent the interests of China’s provincial states or other leading authorities.  
For each share type, I summarize the related exchanges, trading currency and eligible 
investors in Table 2.1. Even though there are no restrictions on the Hong Kong market, 
Chinese residents still have limited access to trade in Hong Kong because of currency 








                                                 
5 By June 2016, there were 1902 listed companies.  
6 A backdoor listing is also known as a reverse takeover. It refers to a privately owned entity seeking a shell 




Table 2.1  
A summary of the different types of shares on the Chinese market. 
Share type  Exchange Currency Traders  
A-shares  Shanghai  
Chinese Renminbi 
(RMB) 





Residents of PRC & 
QFII 
    
B-shares  Shanghai  U.S. dollars (USD) Non-residents of PRC  
& residents of PRC 
(after 2001) 
 Shenzhen 
Hong Kong dollars 
(HKD) 
    
H-shares Hong Kong 
Hong Kong dollars 
(HKD) 
No restriction  
    
Red chips Hong Kong 
Hong Kong dollars 
(HKD) 
No restriction  
Source: SSE, SZSE and HKEx 
 
Table 2.2  







   (% of market) (% ) 
H-shares 172 19.65 32.12 
Red chips 125 21.71 15.43 
All 297 41.36 47.55 
 






  (% of market) (% ) 
H-shares 23 3.13 1.99 
Red chips 5 7.50 2.67 
All 28 10.63 4.66 
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx), 2015 
 
 
Information on the China dimension in the Hong Kong stock market is given in Table 
2.2. By the end of 2014, there were 125 listed red chip companies on the main board 




on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), representing 7.5% of market capitalization. 
One hundred and ninety-five H-share companies are listed on the main board and GEM, 
accounting for 19.65% and 3.13% capitalisation, respectively. The turnover of H-shares 
is larger than red chips on both the main board and GEM.  
 
Table 2.3  







change in 2014 
(%) 
Number of domestic listed 
companies (A-shares and B-
shares )  
2489 2613 4.98% 
Number of domestic listed foreign 
investment shares  
(B-shares )  
106 104 -1.89% 
Number of overseas listed 
companies (H-shares )  
185 206 11.35% 
Total issued shares 
(Unit: 100 million )  
40569.08 43610.13 7.50% 
Total market capitalization 
(Unit: RMB100 million )  
239077.19 372546.96 55.83% 
Turnover 
(Unit: RMB100 million )  
39672.04 181362.61 152.00% 
Average daily turnover  
(Unit: RMB100 million )  
1803.27 7885.33 147.00% 
SSE Composite Index  
(Close )  
2115.98 3234.68 52.87% 
SZSE Composite index  
(Close )  
1057.67 1415.19 33.80% 
Valid stock accounts  
(Unit: 10 thousand )  
13247.15 14214.68 7.30% 





Table 2.3 shows the securities market statistics at the end of December, 2014. A total of 
2613 companies were listed on the mainland Chinese market; 104 of 2613 were of B-
shares. The number of H-shares listed on the Hong Kong market was 206. The total 
market capitalization reached 372546.96 (RMB 100 million) and the turnover was 
181362.61(RMB 100 million). Compared with 2013, the December 2014 SSE and SZSE 
composite indexes experienced a large increase, 52.87% and 33.8%, respectively. 
2.2 A comparison of the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong 
markets  
The trading environments of the mainland Chinese market and Hong Kong market differ 
in various ways. Compared with the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange is more open, better developed and more rigorous about the 
information disclosure.  
2.2.1 Investor composition 
In terms of investor composition, A-shares are issued to the domestic Chinese citizens 
and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), whereas H-shares are available to 
international investors and Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII). Generally, 
the Hong Kong market is more international with a larger proportion of institutional 
investors. Institutional investors from Hong Kong and overseas comprise 65 per cent of 
the total turnover (HKEx, 2016). The mainland Chinese market is dominated by the local 







Figure 1  
Approved quotas for QFII and RQFII. 
 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2016 
 
Regulation of the QFII program was introduced in 2002. It allows licensed foreign 
investors to buy RMB dominated A-shares in mainland China. The qualified domestic 
institutional investors (QDII) scheme was set up in 2006, allowing Chinese institutions 




new program named Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Scheme (RQII) 
was launched in December 2011. It allows Hong Kong subsidiaries7 to invest in the 
mainland Chinese market with Renminbi funds raised in Hong Kong. QFII and RQFII 
must obtain investment licences through the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) and obtain an approved investment quota8 from the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchanges (SAFE). According to the data from Shanghai Stock Exchange, at the 
end of 2015 over 200 foreign institutions had been granted a QFII licence and over 100 
were qualified as RQFIIs. The QFII and RQFII quotas have reached 81.07 billion US 
dollars and 444.33 billion RMB, respectively (Figure1).  
2.2.2 Accounting standards 
The accounting standards used in the two markets are different. Chinese companies are 
required to prepare financial reports based on the Chinese Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). These reports are generally audited by local accounting 
firms. Companies cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange have to follow a dual 
reporting system and prepare the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
disclosures audited by international auditing firms for the convenience of international 
comparison. According to the Central Peoples’ Government of the Peoples’ Republic of 
China, the Ministry of Finance issued new Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises (ASBE) on 15 February 2006. These updated accounting standards 
substantially converged with IFRS and took effect on 1 January 2007. However, cross-
listed companies are still required to follow the dual reporting system. Effective from 15 
December 2010, HKEx introduced a new rule allowing mainland incorporated Chinese 
                                                 
7 Hong Kong subsidiaries refer to subsidiaries that Chinese fund management companies and securities 
companies set up in Hong Kong. 
8 Because of capital control in mainland China, QFIIs have to submit a quota application to SAFE for 
reviewing and approving. Once approved, they can open RMB cash accounts and securities accounts 




companies on the Main Board and Growth Enterprises Market to prepare financial reports 
using mainland Chinese accounting standards.  
2.2.3 Short-sale constraints 
An important difference between the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese markets is the 
short-sale constraints imposed on stocks. A short-selling pilot program was first launched 
with 17 eligible stocks in January 1994. Under the scheme, stocks could not be short-sold 
below the best current asking price. This rule was abolished in 1996 and re-imposed in 
1998. Until now, not all stocks are allowed to short-sell on the Hong Kong stock market. 
Only companies on the designated list are eligible for short-sales but the list is subject to 
regular revision (HKEx, 2016). With regard to the mainland Chinese market, short-
selling was totally banned before 2010. A trial program (i.e., a margin trading and security 
lending scheme) with a list of 90 constituent shares on the SSE 50 and SZSE component 
index was initially approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 
March, 2010. In December 2011, seven exchange traded funds were added to the 
designated list. By the end of December 2014, 856 securities had become eligible to be 
short-sold through the margin trading and security lending policy.  
Table 2.4 lists the events that shares in mainland China experienced with regard to short-
selling. Column 1 gives the effective date of events; column 2 states the number of 
shares/companies added to the list; column 3 states the number of shares/companies 
deleted from the list; and column 4 gives the total number of shares/companies on the list. 
In November 2011, January 2013, September 2013 and September 2014, many 





Table 2.4  
The number of shares/companies on the designated list in mainland China  
 
Date No. added No. deleted No. on the list 
31/03/2010 90  90 
01/07/2010 5 5 90 
29/07/2010 1 1 90 
05/12/2011 189 1 278 
04/06/2012 2  280 
29/10/2012 1  281 
31/01/2013 276  557 
06/03/2013  1 556 
07/03/2013  1 555 
26/03/2013  2 553 
29/03/2013 1 2 552 
10/04/2013 1  553 
24/04/2013 1  554 
02/05/2013  1 553 
03/05/2013  1 552 
27/05/2013 1  553 
25/07/2013 1  554 
05/08/2013 1 2 552 
16/09/2013 203  757 
04/12/2013 1  758 
17/03/2014 1  759 
28/03/2014  1 758 
01/04/2014  1 757 
05/05/2014  2 755 
22/09/2014 101  856 
Source: SSE and SZSE 
 
2.2.4 Corporate governance  
In mainland China, security laws are imposed by CSRC, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. With regard to corporate governance structure, the 
Code of Corporate Governance issued in 2002 specifies the requirements for listed 




1) Shareholder meetings are required once per year. Interim meetings are called by large 
shareholders, boards of directors, or boards of supervisors when necessary. A board is 
required to hold at least two meetings every year.  
2) Listed companies are required to have 5 to 19 directors.  
3) At least one-third of board members are required to be independent directors.  
4) Qualified independent directors have to meet criteria like having no relationship with 
the manager, not being in the top 10 shareholders, not holding more than one per cent of 
the shares, or having business affiliations with the company.  
5) China has a two-tier board structure (i.e., board of directors and board of supervisors). 
6) There must be at least three supervisors on the board and at least one third of 
supervisory members have to be employee representatives.   
When seeking overseas listing, Chinese companies are required to obtain approval from 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and obey additional rules. For 
example, the companies are required to send a 45-day notice to shareholders before 
shareholders’ meetings. Shareholders with greater than 5 per cent of the voting rights are 
allowed to present proposals at the shareholders’ meeting. Dual-listed companies are 
required to release information simultaneously to the domestic and foreign markets.  
The listing requirements on the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges are 
different. For instance, according to a corporate governance practice guide issued by 
HKEx, the definition of connected person or related party is broader in mainland China 
than in Hong Kong. An announcement is required when the transaction value is larger 
than 0.1 (0.5) per cent of net assets in Hong Kong (mainland China). Audit and 




compulsory in mainland China. Blackout periods for directors9 are longer in Hong Kong 
than in Mainland China. In general, companies have to comply with stricter rules. For 
Chinese companies seeking to list on the Hong Kong Exchange as H-shares, some special 
requirements are added. For example, at least one of the independent non-executives is 
required to be a Hong Kong resident; supervisors have to demonstrate their competence 
for the position.  
2.2.5 Other trading rules 
Different trading agreements are also applied in the two markets. Based on the trading 
rules in SSE, SZSE and HKEx, some key differences are: 
1) The mainland Chinese market triggers the suspension of trading when prices move 
beyond the limit; under Hong Kong’s Volatility Control Mechanism (VCM), a five-
minute cooling-off period is triggered when the price of an applicable stock moves 10% 
more than last traded price five minutes ago.  
2) Quoted stocks whose prices are increasing (decreasing) are in red (green) in mainland 
China. The display colour is opposite in Hong Kong.  
3) The settlement cycle for stocks is usually T+1 in mainland China whereas the Hong 
Kong market allows trading on the same day.  
                                                 
9 Blackout periods for directors are periods that directors are prevented from trading around financial and 




4) Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges open from 9:30 am to 11:30 am and 1:00 pm to 
3:00 pm from Monday to Friday; the HKEx runs from 10:00 am to 12:30 am and from 
2:30 pm to 4:00 pm, Monday to Friday.  
5) The Hong Kong stock market allows investors to hold physical certificates but such a 
practice is not found in the mainland China stock market. 
2.3 The price discrepancy puzzle  
A price difference for one company simultaneously traded in two segmented markets is 
well known. Unlike cross-listed stocks in other markets, there are limited arbitrage 
channels for A- and H-shares in China.  
The Hang Seng China AH Premium Index (HSAHP) measures the average price spread 
of A-shares over H-shares for the largest and most liquid cross-listed Chinese companies 
traded in mainland China and Hong Kong. If HSAHP is less (more) than 100, it indicates 
A-shares are traded at a discount (premium) compared with H-shares. As shown in Figure 
2, A-shares are mostly traded at premium relative to simultaneously traded H-shares. 
Various explanations are provided in the literature about this price disparity puzzle. 
Chakravarty, Sarkar, and Wu (1998) emphasize the issue of information asymmetry. 
Foreign investors10 bear an information disadvantage compared with local investors11 
and therefore are reluctant to pay the same price. Fernald and Rogers (2002) point to the 
problem of limited investment opportunities in mainland China, therefore, local investors 
are more willing to purchase at a relatively higher price given fewer investment options. 
                                                 
10 Foreign investors refer to investors outside mainland China (H-share investors). 




Chan and Kwok (2005) document other issues like capital controls, a low interest rate, 
and low liquidity in the debt market12.  
It is noteworthy that the average HSAHP dropped below 100 around the beginning of 
2014. This HSAHP discount may be related to the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 
Program announced by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the China 
Securities Regularity Commission (CSRC) on 10 April 2014. This connect program is an 
important step to speed up the integration of the mainland and Hong Kong stock markets. 
In addition to QFII, RQFII and QDII, it allows more Chinese investors to participate in 
the Hong Kong market and more foreign investors to purchase A-shares in China. In this 
way, Chinese investors are offered more investment alternatives and investment 
diversification. Also, it improves the trading efficiency for cross-listed AH shares. 
However, it is surprising that, after the official launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong 
Connect Programme on 17 November 2014, the premium of A-shares over H-shares 
increased to around 30%. This may be explained by imperfect arbitrage because of the 
strict eligibility criteria for individual investors13 and short-selling restrictions.  
  
                                                 
12 In China, the debt market is concentrated in government securities and therefore presents low liquidity. 
13 Qualified RQFII Individual investors are required to hold at least RMB 500,000 on aggregate in their 




Figure 2  
The Hang Seng China AH Premium Index 2010 to 2016 
 












3 Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the related research areas. The first section discusses the factors that 
influence stock return synchronicity. The second section summarises the determinants of 
liquidity commonality. The third section reviews the role of short-sale constraints in the 
market. The fourth section covers the relationship between news sentiment and the stock 
market. The last section discusses how corporate governance influences firms’ 
information environment. The main focus of this chapter is to build a comprehensive 
understanding of return synchronicity and associate it to short-sale constraints, news 
sentiment, and corporate governance.  
3.1 Return synchronicity  
Roll (1988) suggests that stock synchronicity can be explained by the amount of firm-
specific information, relative to the market or industry information, being incorporated 
into stock prices. This idea has been further investigated and developed in a body of 
literature at both the country and firm level. Various explanations have been provided. 
Early empirical research studied return synchronicity at the country level. The focus was 
on countries’ economic fundamentals (e.g., per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), 
institutional settings, and the quality of the information environment (e.g., Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu, 2000; Jin and Myers, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008, 2009; Kim and Shi, 
2010; Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang, 2015). Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) examine return 
synchronicity across 40 countries and find a larger stock return co-movement in 
developing countries with weak property rights than in developed markets with stronger 
legal protection. They suggest that poor investor protection would reduce the 




They also show a declined return synchronicity in the U.S. market over the twentieth 
century. Similarly, Jin and Myers (2006) document a positive relationship between return 
synchronicity and countries’ opaqueness. They further argue that the lack of 
transparency 14  is essential to reinforce the relationship between imperfect investor 
protection and the increase in return synchronicity. Using a risk division theory (i.e., the 
division of risk-bearing between managers and investors), they suggest that opaqueness 
leads to high return synchronicity and also shifts firm-specific risk to managers. It can be 
beneficial and harmful. The good side is allowing managers to take full advantage of cash 
flows when the company operates well. The bad side is encouraging managers to take the 
temporary downside risk and losses in the short term. In the long run, when bad news 
accumulates to the level that managers are not able to absorb it, large negative returns are 
delivered. Based on the time series evidence of decreasing return synchronicity in U.S. 
shown by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Li, Morck, Yang, and Yeung (2004) present a 
similar but weak pattern across most emerging markets. They find that decreasing 
synchronicity is related to greater capital market openness, but not goods market 
openness. The relationship is more significant in countries with better government. 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and Kim and Shi (2010) also demonstrate higher 
synchronicity in emerging markets than in developed markets. For instance, Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2008) examine the synchronicity change of non-U.S. stocks that cross-listed 
in the U.S. market. Cross-listing is suggested as a strategy to improve information 
disclosure. Their results indicate an asymmetric impact of cross-listing on return 
synchronicity between developing and developed countries. Firms in developed markets 
with strong investor protection have lower return synchronicity through cross-listing, but 
                                                 
14 Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) point out two types of transparency, financial transparency and 
governance transparency. Financial transparency refers to the quality and frequency of financial disclosure. 




it is not so for firms in emerging markets. Chan and Hameed (2006) summarize some key 
reasons for high return synchronicity in emerging markets. First, developing countries 
may establish the same disclosure requirements as developed countries. Nevertheless, in 
practice, regulations are not firmly enforced. Second, voluntary disclosure is not strongly 
encouraged in emerging markets compared with developed markets. Third, concentrated 
ownership is prevalent in emerging countries. When firms are dominated by families or 
the government, or affiliated with large business groups, cash-flow rights and voting 
rights diverge. Concentrated ownership provides controlling shareholders with 
opportunities to act in their own interest at the cost of minority shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000). To serve their purpose, controlling 
shareholders are more likely to withhold value-relevant information, resulting in 
information asymmetry (Fan and Wong, 2005). This information inequality would lead 
to increased costs of obtaining information and consequently decreased benefit of 
informed trading. Finally, the incorporation of firm-specific information is discouraged 
and return synchronicity increases. From an alternative perspective, the common internal 
financing pool or common business strategies within business groups may also contribute 
to the return co-movement. Most recently, Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang (2015) 
investigate return synchronicity across 41 countries. They find that a country’s 
institutional environment and information production are positively correlated. Moreover, 
stock co-movement is higher in countries with stronger institutions than in those with 
weaker institutions. These authors argue that there are impediments to informed trading 
in less developed countries.  
With respect to firm-level return synchronicity, empirical evidence is mixed. Consistent 
with the literature above, numerous papers present an inverse relationship between firm-




and Zarowin, 2003; Veldkamp, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009; Gul, Kim, 
and Qiu, 2010). Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) investigate the relationship 
between stock return synchronicity and stock price informativeness using accounting 
measures. Stock price informativeness is measured by the extent to which the amount of 
information reflects future earnings in stock prices. This is estimated in a regression of 
current stock returns against future earnings. Their findings suggest that return 
synchronicity is negatively related to stock price informativeness. Veldkamp (2006) 
argues that stock returns co-move more when a piece of information can be 
simultaneously obtained by many investors, or can be used to forecast a number of 
different assets. Their argument implies a negative relationship between firm-specific 
information and return co-movement. Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) employ 
earnings management as a measure of opacity and support the view that opacity is 
positively correlated with stock return synchronicity. Moreover, opaque firms are more 
likely to have high crash risk, supporting the argument of Jin and Myers (2006). Gul, 
Kim, and Qiu (2010) also find that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock 
returns is inversely associated with return synchronicity.  
Contrary to the above findings, another stream of literature suggests that low stock return 
synchronicity is associated with lower level firm-specific information (e.g., Dasgupta, 
Gan, and Gao, 2010; Chan, Hameed, and Kang, 2013; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2013; Kelly, 
2014). Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao (2010) argue that when the information environment is 
transparent, investors are able to obtain more information and frequently incorporate the 
information into prices. In this way, the market would be less surprised when events 
actually occur and tend to respond to such news less strongly. The empirical evidence 
supports their argument and shows that more transparent firms have less price variation 




return synchronicity is associated with lower information asymmetry. They argue that 
investors can infer future movements of stocks if they have a close co-movement with 
the market. However, it is much more difficult to predict stocks’ future movements if 
they have their own pattern. Using various illiquidity measures, such as effective spread, 
price impact, and Amihud illiquidity, they find stocks with higher return synchronicity 
have higher liquidity. This indicates that stocks that exhibit higher return synchronicity 
have less information asymmetry and encourage more liquidity. Hou, Peng, and Xiong 
(2013) find that stocks’ lower return synchronicity is related to medium-term price 
momentum and long- term price reversal, suggesting that low return synchronicity could 
be related to price inefficiency. In terms of firm characteristics, Kelly (2014) provides 
empirical evidence that stocks with low R2 are usually small, young companies with 
lower institutional ownership, lower analyst coverage, lower liquidity and higher 
transaction costs. Therefore, a low R2 represents a low level of price informativeness and 
weak information environment. 
Some studies relate stock return synchronicity to investor type (e.g., Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015). 
Investors can be categorized in different ways, such as individual versus institutional 
investors, local versus foreign investors, or SOEs versus non-SOEs, etc. Institutional 
investors, compared with individual investors, tend to have superior capabilities, 
resources and skills to collect and process value-relevant firm-specific information. The 
role that institutional investors play in the stock market has been reported in the literature. 
For example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) find a strong, positive relationship between 
change of institutional ownership and future returns, and no subsequent return reversals 




investors. Yan and Zhang (2009) document that short-term institutional trading15 predicts 
future stock returns but not long-term institutional trading16. The forecasting does not 
reverse, suggesting that short-term institutions are better informed. Boehmer and Kelly 
(2009) use data from NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 2004 to examine the relation 
between institutional investors and price information efficiency. They find institutional 
trading leads to enhanced price efficiency and an improved information environment. 
Given the outstanding role institutional investors play in the stock market, Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) argue that different types of investor possess a different information 
advantage towards market-wide, industry-wide, and firm-specific information. They 
show that the presence of insiders and large institutional investors has the net effect of 
increasing the amount of firm-specific information being incorporated into stock prices. 
Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) studied Chinese listed firms from 1996 to 2003 and show a 
higher return synchronicity for companies with greater government-related ownership. 
Conversely, foreign investors and auditor quality decrease return synchronicity. Li, 
Brockman, and Zurbruegg (2015) examine Chinese cross-listed shares in mainland China 
and Hong Kong and show that shares that are traded by more foreign investors impound 
a greater amount of firm-specific information into stock prices and, thus, present lower 
return synchronicity.  
Other literature examines the impact of return synchronicity on capital allocation (e.g., 
Wurgler, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004). For example, through an investigation 
across 65 countries, Wurgler (2000) demonstrates that the efficiency of capital allocation 
is negatively related to stock return synchronicity. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) 
show that U.S. firms with lower return synchronicity are more likely to obtain external 
                                                 
15 Short-term institutional trading refers to more active institutional trading.  




financing and achieve more efficient capital allocation. These studies propose that firms 
with larger firm-specific price variations (i.e., low return synchronicity) provide higher 
liquidity and lower transaction costs. Therefore, the participation of informed 
arbitrageurs is encouraged. It improves price efficiency, facilitates external financing and 
makes the corporate investment more efficient. 
3.2 Liquidity commonality  
The study of liquidity can be traced back to the 1970s. Bagehot (1971) suggests that 
market makers are critical to ensure a liquid stock market. They are market specialists 
who step into the market to provide liquidity whenever buy and sell orders fail to match 
at certain time. Generally, market makers win the game when they transact with liquidity-
motivated traders and lose when they transact with informed traders. Liquidity indicates 
the speed and the ease at which investors can trade, but it is not easy to capture. To 
understand liquidity, Kyle (1985) proposes three elements. The first is tightness, which 
refers to the cost of successfully buying or selling assets in a short time. The second is 
depth. Depth captures the capability of digesting the submitted orders without incurring 
a big price movement. The third element is resilience. Resilience indicates the speed at 
which stock prices bounce back from uninformative shocks. Harris (1990) defines liquid 
stocks as shares that can be converted into cash immediately at minimum cost. The 
estimation of liquidity is described in diverse ways. For instance, trading volumes are 
suggested as a proxy by Karpoff (1986). He explains high trading volumes in two ways. 
First, investors disagree on the information, implying different interpretations of the same 
information. Second, they interpret the information in the same way but hold divergent 
prior expectations. The other commonly used liquidity measure is bid-ask spread. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that investors can either execute the order 




the ask price contains a premium for immediate buying whereas the bid price contains a 
concession for immediate selling. Liquidity is measured by combining the buying 
premium and selling concession.  
The importance of liquidity is well-known, but evidence of the existence of liquidity 
commonality and what leads to such co-movement is not fully understood. A body of 
literature demonstrates the existence of a systematic liquidity factor (e.g., Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; 
Brockman and Chung, 2002; Bauer, 2004; Kempf, and Mayston, 2008). Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam (2000) conduct research on the common liquidity movements on 
1169 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks for 254 trading days in 1992. They 
measure the co-movement using various measures including quoted spreads, quoted 
depth, and effective spreads. Common liquidity is significant and material after 
controlling for individual liquidity determinants such as volatility, volume and price. 
They also document an industry component and a size effect. Huberman and Halka (2001) 
test systematic liquidity using daily data of stocks traded on NYSE and document a time-
varying systematic liquidity factor. They conjecture that this systematic component 
emerges through the presence of noise traders. Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) examine 
liquidity commonality of 30 stocks using the 15-minute interval quote data. With 
principal component analysis they find a significant single common factor on order flows 
that explains approximately two-thirds of the return synchronicity. In addition to these 
studies conducted in quote-driven markets, Brockman and Chung (2002) and Bauer 
(2004) demonstrate liquidity commonality in order-driven markets using a data set from 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Swiss Stock Exchange, respectively. Unlike a 
quote-driven market, under an electronic and order-driven market structure, there is no 




allows them to withdraw liquidity during liquidity shocks. On the other hand, when they 
are free to enter, commonality would be less pronounced since the buy and sell orders 
can be easily spread out among a large amount of liquidity providers. Using intraday 
observations from 725 companies between May 1996 and December 1999, Brockman 
and Chung (2002) document a weaker systematic liquidity than reported in the quote-
driven market. From a different angle, given the fact that some institutional investors 
walk up the order book, Kempf and Mayston (2008) use intraday limit order book data 
to test the liquidity commonality beyond best prices. They show liquidity commonality 
beyond the inside spread is much larger than it is at the inside spread. In addition, the 
commonality level is higher in the morning or when the market is falling.  
Another body of research investigates whether systematic liquidity risk is priced in equity 
markets (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Chen, 2005; Sadka, 
2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Watanabe and Watanabe, 2008). Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) find that stocks that are more sensitive to systematic liquidity have 
higher expected returns. Moreover, the liquidity risk factor helps to explain half of the 
profits generated from a momentum strategy (i.e., purchasing past winners and selling 
past losers). Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose a liquidity adjusted asset pricing 
model (LCAPM). The LCAPM provides a better explanation than a standard asset pricing 
model. Specifically, stocks that are more sensitive to the aggregate liquidity fluctuation 
earn larger returns than those that are less sensitive to the aggregate liquidity variation. 
Market participants are suggested to pay more attention to stock performance and 
tradability in market downturns and in liquidity dry-up periods. Chen (2005) uses a 
principal component technique to extract a common factor from seven liquidity proxies 
constructed on a daily basis. Consistent with Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) paper, the 




Moreover, stock liquidity, which is different from volatility, also provides an explanation 
for the momentum and price in bond markets. Sadka (2006) decomposes firm-level 
liquidity variation into variable and fixed price effects. He suggests that systematic 
liquidity is priced in the context of momentum and post earnings announcement drift 
portfolio returns. Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) examine 4055 NYSE listed stocks between 
1983 and 2000 and construct a common factor from eight different measures of liquidity. 
They show the pricing power of systematic liquidity. Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) 
demonstrate the existence of time-varying liquidity betas and a liquidity risk premium. 
That is, stocks with higher return sensitives to aggregate liquidity variation earn higher 
expected returns.  
Broadly speaking, liquidity commonality is induced by the common movement in the 
demand for liquidity, the supply of liquidity or both. Prior research tries to decompose 
the supply-side and demand-side effects, but to identify which perspective is at work at a 
certain time is a challenging task (Coughenour and Saad, 2004). Instead of the demand-
supply perspective, the reasons for liquidity commonality are summarized as follows.  
First, liquidity commonality can arise from financial intermediaries’ funding constraints, 
especially in market downturns (e.g., Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009; Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; Næs, Skjeltorp, and Odegaard, 
2011; Rosch and Kaserer, 2013; Comerton-forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and 
Seasholes, 2010). Coughenour and Saad (2004) argue that liquidity would co-move 
among stocks handled by the same specialist firm. This liquidity commonality is induced 
by common adjustments in the liquidity supply from a common pool of capital and 
inventory. They also find that co-variation is larger during a period with relatively large 
negative market returns. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) study the association 




amount of funds that financial intermediaries provide depends on the capital and margin 
requirements. In market declines or periods of highly uncertain firms’ fundamentals, 
funding would be low and discourage traders from taking a position. This would lead to 
tight market liquidity and high volatility, further worsening the funding liquidity. 
Therefore, during financial distress, market liquidity and funding liquidity mutually 
reinforce. Similarly, Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) show that commonality in 
liquidity on the New York Stock Exchange increases when the market declines, 
especially during periods of tight liquidity. Næs, Skjeltorp, and Odegaard (2011) suggest 
a strong relationship between stock market liquidity and the business cycle. Systematic 
liquidity variation is associated with “flight to quality17” during a recession. Rosch and 
Kaserer (2013) provide supporting evidence showing stronger liquidity commonality in 
market downturns, especially during a financial crisis. Comerton-forde, Hendershott, 
Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010) argue that the liquidity supply from the market-
maker matters for time-varying liquidity. They employ 11 years of NYSE specialist 
inventory positions and trading revenue data and show wider spreads at both aggregate 
market-level and specialist firm-level when specialists have large positions or lose money.  
 
Second, some research focuses on the level of institutional ownership and correlated 
trading activity (e.g., Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). 
The rationale is that higher institutional ownership leads to higher correlated trading 
across stocks. The subsequently intense buying/selling pressure results in a commonality 
in liquidity. Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008) document a liquidity commonality variation 
from 1963 to 2005 in the U.S. stock market. In detail, large firms show increased liquidity 
commonality whereas small firms show decreased liquidity commonality. This 
                                                 




phenomenon can be explained by the increase in institutional ownership over time and 
their preferred trading in large stocks. It also lends support to Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam’s (2000) conclusion that institutional investors exhibit stronger herding 
behaviour when they trade large stocks and less herding when they trade smaller stocks. 
Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2016) examine the correlated trading of mutual funds and 
show that stocks with higher mutual fund ownership present liquidity co-movement about 
twice as high as those stocks with lower mutual fund ownership. This correlation is 
stronger among stocks owned by mutual funds with higher turnover ratios and during 
periods of negative aggregate mutual fund flows.  
Third, investor sentiment can contribute to commonality in liquidity. Based on Black’s 
(1986) argument with respect to noise traders (i.e., noise traders facilitate liquidity), 
Huberman and Halka (2001) conjecture that liquidity commonality can be caused by the 
presence of noise traders. However, they do not provide a model to capture the 
relationship. Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) investigate liquidity commonality with 
various sentiment measures, including the U.S. investor sentiment index, local closed-
end fund discounts and global closed-end fund discounts18. Their results suggest that 
liquidity commonality is higher when investors’ sentiment is more optimistic.  
Fourth, international studies pay more attention to the importance of the information 
environment (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2007; Brockman, Chung, and 
Pérignon, 2009, Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012; Liang and Wei, 2012; Dang, Moshirian, 
Wee, and Zhang (2015)). Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) investigate the country 
level liquidity risk in 19 emerging markets. They suggest a stronger predictability of 
liquidity on expected returns in countries with high political risk and poor law systems. 
                                                 





Brockman and Pérignon (2009) study liquidity commonality across 47 stock exchanges 
using intraday spread and depth data. Apart from the exchange level systematic factor, 
they illustrate a significant global component in both bid-ask spread and depth. Compared 
with exchange level sources that contribute to commonality in liquidity (roughly 39%), 
the global source contributes an additional 19%. Asian stock exchanges exhibit the 
strongest commonality in bid-ask spread and depth. Liang and Wei (2012) show that 
global liquidity risk is a significant pricing factor across developed countries after 
controlling for global market, value and size factors. They also suggest that a more 
effective country level corporate governance structure and a better investor protection 
mechanism decrease the liquidity premium. Karolyi, Lee and van Dijk (2012) examine 
stocks across 40 countries around the world and suggest that liquidity commonality is 
greater in countries with a larger proportion of institutional investors, more correlated 
trading behaviour, low transparency and in times of high market volatility. Dang, 
Moshirian, Wee, and Zhang (2015) examine the impact of cross-listing on stock liquidity 
commonality and suggest an asymmetric impact on the local and host markets. 
Specifically, co-movements with the local market decrease whereas the co-variations 
with the host market increase. This negative impact of cross-listing on local market 
liquidity commonality is more pronounced in countries with weak institutional 
environment, less transparency, and high market segmentation. 
Finally, cross-asset learning of price information has a significant impact on liquidity 
commonality (e.g., Gallmeyer, Hollifield, and Seppi, 2005; Patton and Verardo, 2012; 
Liu and Wang, 2013; Cespa and Foucault, 2014). Gallmeyer, Hollifield, and Seppi (2005) 
find that dynamic trading activity helps asymmetrically informed investors to learn about 
others’ preferences. It means investors can use trading data (e.g., trading volumes and 




builds up a link between market liquidity and future returns. Patton and Verardo’s (2012) 
model is based on the rationale that investors tend to do cross-asset learning about firm-
level fundamentals. Firms with informative earnings information present returns that co-
move strongly with the market since these stocks are considered benchmarks for other 
stocks. The empirical results show that, following earnings announcements, firms whose 
earnings contain information about the profitability of non-announcing firms experience 
greater increases in market betas. The increase is greater for stocks with higher turnover 
and analyst following. Liu and Wang (2013) suggest that liquidity commonality is driven 
by investors’ learning about asset payoffs from other asset payoffs. This helps to explain 
why commonality in liquidity and prices can be caused by non-fundamental news. Cespa 
and Foucault (2014) argue that liquidity providers learn information about an asset from 
other assets. Therefore, a small liquidity variation of an individual asset, through a 
feedback loop, leads to a large variation in market liquidity and price informativeness. 
This feedback loop provides alternative explanations for liquidity commonality and 
liquidity dry-ups. 
3.3 The role of short-sale constraints in the market 
Not all markets and nor a given market at all times trade unrestricted. Indeed, short-sales 
are completely or partially prohibited in most emerging markets (Bris, Goetzmann, and 
Zhu, 2007). Some developed markets ban short-selling during financial crises (Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang, 2013). Short-sale constraints influence the capital market in numerous 
ways and evidence of the impact is controversial. The following discussion covers some 
important issues such as the stock overvaluation, the asymmetric impact of positive and 




The first issue is overvaluation. Theoretically, Miller (1977) proposes that short-sales 
constraints result in more optimistic opinions attached to prices and stocks are 
consequently overpriced. The rationale for the overvaluation is as follows. When short-
sales are not permitted, or are costly to implement, pessimistic investors bail out of the 
market. The market is then directed by optimistic investors who continuously bid up stock 
prices above the fundamental level. Consistent with Miller (1977), Figlewski (1981) 
points out the disproportionate weight to optimistic forecasts compared with pessimistic 
forecasts because of short-sale constraints, which results in overvaluation. Other papers 
also show an adverse impact of short-sale constraints on future returns (e.g., Asquith and 
Meulbroek, 1995; Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan, 1998; Danielsen and Sorescu, 
2001). Jones and Lamont (2002) provide additional evidence in showing that expensive 
or difficult-to-short-sell stocks exhibit high valuation and low subsequent returns. Using 
mutual fund data, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) also support the evidence of 
overvaluation and show that stocks with short-sale constraints realize lower future returns. 
Research by Ofek and Richardson (2003) investigated option lockups19 using a sample 
of internet stocks from 1998 to 2000. They document a negative impact of constraints on 
subsequent returns, supporting the overvaluation argument. 
A number of papers suggest an asymmetric impact of short-sale constraints on stocks 
with positive and negative news. These studies argue that short sale constraints have a 
stronger impact on negative information. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model the 
effects of short-sale constraints on stocks’ speed of adjustment to the information. They 
find that short-sale constraints have an asymmetric effect on positive and negative 
information. Stocks that are prohibited from short-selling adjust more slowly to bad news 
                                                 





than good news. Nevertheless, different from Miller (1977), they argue that short-sale 
constraints would not lead to an overvaluation on average, assuming traders have rational 
expectations. Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998) examined the Australian Stock 
Exchange on the intraday basis and suggest short-sales are almost instantaneously bad 
news. Biais, Bisiere, and Decamps (1999) investigate stocks subject to leverage and 
short-sale constraints traded on the Paris spot market. They show the stocks reflect 
positive information more quickly than negative information. Reed (2007) documents 
that stocks subject to short-sale constraints have a larger price reaction to earnings 
announcements, particularly negative news, implying informational inefficiency for 
constrained stocks. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) analyse 46 equity markets around 
world using both cross-sectional and time-series data to test whether short-selling affects 
market efficiency. They find that, in countries without short-selling constraints, prices 
incorporate negative information more quickly.  
The literature on whether short-sale constraints stabilize the capital market is 
controversial. In supporting the argument of market destabilization, Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) find stock returns are more negatively skewed when short-selling is 
not allowed. Hong and Stein (2003) develop a market crash theory based on investors’ 
heterogeneous opinions (bearish versus bullish investors). They argue that short-selling 
constraints restrict the incorporation of negative information by bearish investors. If 
bearish investors are forced to sit out of the market, the accumulating negative news 
would be revealed in the price when the market falls, which further exacerbates market 
declines and ultimately leads to a market crash. They argue that extreme negative returns 
are more pronounced when short-sale constraints are imposed. In supporting the 
argument of market stabilization, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) examine the 




and market indices. They find that in markets where short selling is not allowed or not 
practised, market returns display less negative skewness, which contradicts the results of 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Hong and Stein (2003). Nevertheless, they fail to 
identify significant differences in skewness at the individual stock level. Consistently, 
Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007) document increased volatility, lower skewness, and 
increased occurrence of extremely negative returns after a short-sale ban is lifted in Hong 
Kong. Other evidence shows an insignificant relationship between short-sale constraints 
and price instability. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) study the relationship between short-
sale constraints and price efficiency using a global data set across 26 countries. They find 
that relaxing constraints is not related to increased price instability or increased 
occurrence of negative returns. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) investigate the U.S. 
short-sale ban in September 2008 and find stock prices seem unaffected by the ban. 
There are some other issues related to short-sale constraints, such as price efficiency 
(Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010; Chen and Rhee, 2010), dispersion of opinion (Li and 
Fleisher, 2004; Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu, 
2006), and short-selling commonality (Lynch, Nikolic, Yan, and Yu, 2014). For example, 
Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) use a global data set from 26 countries and show that stocks 
with short-sale constraints have lower price efficiency. Chen and Rhee (2010) focus on 
the Hong Kong market in which some shares can be short while others cannot. They 
document a more rapid price adjustment among shortable stocks than non-shortable 
stocks in Hong Kong. With the unique setting in Hong Kong that shares will be removed 
from or added into the short-sell list quarterly, they measure the speed of price adjustment 
three months before and after a stock is added into the short-sell list. They find short-
selling has a positive effect on the speed of price adjustment. In terms of opinion 




dispersion of domestic analysts’ forecasts is negatively correlated to stock returns in the 
A-share market (i.e., the market where short sales restrictions are binding), but is not 
significantly related to the returns of B-shares (i.e., the market where short sales 
restrictions are not binding). Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) use the dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts to measure the degree of divergence of opinion and show that 
stocks with higher dispersion earn lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks. 
They argue that analysts’ incentive structures 20  can be viewed as an alternative 
mechanism to short-sale constraints. Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) show that 
the interaction between high dispersion of investor opinion and short sales constraints 
leads to stock price overvaluation. From a new point of view, Lynch, Nikolic, Yan, and 
Yu (2014) find the existence short-selling commonality and suggest that short-sellers act 
on market-wide information. They also find that stocks with higher hedge fund ownership 
present stronger commonality in short-sales. Moreover, commonality in short-selling is 
stronger in market downturns and among high beta stocks, suggesting a lower willingness 
to short-sell if there is a positive market return.  
3.4 Tone of news and the market response 
News is the source of stock price movements. Substantial research has been conducted 
in finance and accounting to examine the value relevance of quantitative information. 
Admittedly, sophisticated statistics have aided us to develop a deeper understanding of 
financial markets. Nevertheless, the quantitative content alone still has difficulties in fully 
explaining stock market movements. Therefore, research has recently switched its focus 
from quantitative content to qualitative content. The studies employ advanced textual 
analysis to convert qualitative information into quantifiable scores by analysing the 
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optimistic or pessimistic tone of the news. The quantitative information, alongside the 
qualitative information, assists investors to better understand firms’ prospects. 
Empirical evidence illustrates the importance of qualitative information and demonstrates 
an asymmetric market reaction to good and bad news (e.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004; 
Tetlock, 2007; García, 2013). The pioneering research in finance that focuses on textual 
analysis was conducted by Antweiler and Frank (2004). By analysing the activity of 
internet stock message boards posted on the Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull websites, 
they document greater trading volumes when larger disagreements in investors’ opinions 
are present. Tetlock (2007) adopts the General Inquirer and Harvard IV-4 dictionary to 
analyse the content of news released in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) column “Abreast 
of the market”. He finds that the daily Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index is 
significantly negatively related to the frequency of negative words in the news. Similarly, 
García (2013) investigates the relationship between the market return and news using the 
daily DJIA index returns and the news in “Financial Markets” and “Topics in Wall Street” 
columns. He divides the words in the news into positive and negative and provides 
evidence on the negative relationship between media pessimism and daily DJIA returns. 
Additionally, García (2013) points out that the negative relationship is pronounced in 
market recessions, suggesting an asymmetric optimistic and pessimistic media sentiment 
in financial markets under different market conditions. Other research conducted by 
Dougal, Engelberg, García, and Parsons (2012) associates the tone of news with stock 
returns from the perspective of an analysis of journalist styles. They propose that one 
piece of news can be interpreted with a more bullish or bearish tone because of journalists’ 
different styles. They find that the fixed effects of journalists’ styles increase the R2 by 
roughly 35%. The results imply the importance of interpreting the public news with 




Some research emphasizes the importance of optimistic and pessimistic information in 
accounting and financial reports (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Chan, 2003; 
Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009; Truong, 2011). Skinner (1994) documents a greater 
stock response to negative earnings forecasts than to positive earnings forecasts. Kasznik 
and Lev (1995) report a greater earnings surprise for firms that release negative earnings 
forecasts than for positive earnings forecasts. Chan (2003) shows that the post earnings 
announcements drift is larger up to 12 months after the scheduled announcement for firms 
issuing bad news compared with those releasing positive news. Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, 
and Macskassy (2008) suggest that the fraction of negative words in firm-specific 
disclosures has predictive power on stocks’ future earnings and returns. Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki (2009) also find evidence in support of the asymmetric post earnings 
announcement drift. They argue that managers tend to withhold bad news but release 
good news immediately. Also, investors exert more trust in unfavourable news than 
favourable news. In the Chinese market, Truong (2011) finds that the drift is larger after 
negative earnings announcements than positive earnings surprises. He suggests that the 
asymmetric post earnings announcement drift is caused by short sale constraints. 
The asymmetric influence of positive and negative news on the stock market can be 
explained by the prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) or the psychological 
principle (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986) propose a loss aversion theory that shows larger negative responses to 
losses than positive responses to similar size gains. In the psychology field, Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs (2001) show that bad events have greater power than 
good events and it is a general principle used widely for diverse psychological 
phenomena. Such an asymmetric response is also supported by an experiment conducted 




Dutch EU Constitutional referendum on the risk-induced electoral mobilization. They 
find that EU-sceptics have more incentive to participate in the elections when they are 
given an unfavourable story than a favourable one. 
3.5 Corporate governance and firms’ information 
environment 
High quality information disclosure can help to reduce the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders. In contrast, poor information disclosure can mislead 
investors. Prior literature has built a link between firms’ corporate governance structure 
and the information environment. For instance, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine 
the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary financial disclosure, which 
is measured by management earnings forecasts. Corporate governance, in their paper, 
was estimated by corporate boards, audit committees and ownership characteristics. They 
show that the effective corporate governance is related to a higher willingness to provide 
earnings forecasts with regular updates. Moreover, effective corporate governance is 
even more strongly associated with management forecasting in the presence of bad news, 
suggesting a more protective mechanism for investors in firms with better corporate 
governance. To illustrate a causal relationship, Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen 
(2012) use the passage of the state antitakeover laws in U.S. as an exogenous event to 
overcome the endogeneity issue. They find that the passage of the antitakeover laws 
decreases the information asymmetry, reduces private information and improves the 
informativeness of the financial statements. Other literature demonstrates improved 
transparency from certain perspectives, such as the percentage of independent directors 




2006), supervisory boards (Xu and Lin, 2016), and CEO duality (Grove, Patelli, and 
Victoravich, 2011).  
Two papers have established a relationship between corporate governance and stock 
return synchronicity (Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015). 
Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) investigate Chinese listed companies from 1996 to 2003. They 
find an inverse relationship between auditor quality and return synchronicity. Moreover, 
stock return synchronicity is a concave function of ownership concentration. Since Gul, 
Kim, and Qiu’s (2010) sample period does not include the implementation of QDII 
(Qualified Domestic Institutional investors) program in 2007, Li, Brockman, and 
Zurbruegg (2015) provide additional evidence using Chinese listed companies from 
January 2005 to December 2010. They divide the corporate governance variables into 
four categories: ownership structure variables, board characteristic variables, 
compensation variables, and capital structure. Their empirical results show improved 
firm-specific information incorporation because of the increased participation of foreign 














4 Hypotheses development  
This chapter re-emphasizes the key literature that motivates my research and presents the 
questions that I attempt to answer. I will also present the reasons for achieving these 
objectives through a unique market frame in China. 
The main literature stream is related to the factors that influence stock return 
synchronicity, such as the institutional strength (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Jin 
and Myers, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008, 2009; Kim and Shi, 2010; Dang, 
Moshirian, and Zhang, 2015), traders (e.g., Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015), and firm opaqueness (e.g., 
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003; Veldkamp, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian, 2009; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao, 2010; Chan, 
Hameed, and Kang, 2013; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2013; Kelly, 2014). These studies 
suggest that stock return synchronicity is lower in countries with stronger institutional 
settings, more transparent information disclosure, and a larger proportion of institutional 
investors. Lower return synchronicity indicates that investors incorporate more firm-
specific information into stock prices. Even though these authors document various 
factors that lead to different degrees of return synchronicity, no one has focussed on the 
information per se (positive versus negative). Indeed, the news content is the fundamental 
source influencing the returns and then the return synchronicity.  
Before attempting to build a direct link between news sentiment (i.e., optimistic versus 
pessimistic) and return synchronicity, I introduce two literature streams that relate news 




and positive news on the stock market (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Chan, 
2003; Tetlock, 2007; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009; Truong, 2011; García, 2013). 
These authors argue that investors respond more to bad news than good news. Such a 
phenomenon can be explained by the prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) or 
the psychology theory (Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001). The second stream 
examines the impact of short-sale constraints on stock movements. It is suggested that 
short-sale constraints influence optimistic and pessimistic information asymmetrically. 
The impact is more pronounced towards pessimistic information disclosures (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan, 1998; Biais, Bisiere, 
and Decamps, 1999; Reed, 2007; and Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007). Consequently, 
trading activities on pessimistic news are restricted and bearish investors bail out of the 
market, resulting in an overvaluation (e.g., Miller, 1977; Figlewski, 1981; Asquith and 
Meulbroek, 1995; Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan, 1998; Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001; 
Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002; Jones and Lamont, 2002; and Ofek and Richardson, 2003). 
Furthermore, market stability can be affected (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Bris, 
Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007; Chang, Cheng, and Yu, 2007; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010; 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013). In summary, investors are strongly inclined to 
pessimistic information disclosures but they may be bound by short-sale restrictions. 
Therefore, the obstacles to impounding negative information exert an asymmetric impact 
of positive and negative news on stock returns. I conjecture a similar effect on return 
synchronicity.  
I propose an asymmetric impact of good and bad information on return synchronicity, 
which occurs from a change of short-sale constraints. This fills the gap in the previous 
return synchronicity literature by considering the information per se (positive versus 




stock synchronicity. In addition, institutional investors possess a better ability to short 
sell than individual investors (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008). I will test this 
difference using a Chinese data set that segments individual and institutional investors’ 
trading. I expect to observe a more pronounced impact of short-sale constraints on return 
synchronicity among shares held by institutional investors than individual investors.  
To achieve these objectives, the A- and H- dual listed shares (A-shares on the Mainland 
China Stock Exchanges and H-shares on the Hong Kong Exchange) in China are selected 
as a sample to run the tests. This set offers a natural vantage point for the investigation 
for the following reasons. First, an AH dual-listed stock refers to one company traded in 
one country but two economic zones. It provides better controls when making a cross-
market comparison. Secondly, short-selling is permitted only for certain stocks in both 
the A- and H-share markets21, making it possible to compare the return synchronicity 
between shortable and non-shortable shares in a single market. The list of designated 
short-selling securities in the two markets differs and is subject to regular revision. 
Thirdly, the mainland Chinese stock market is dominated by individual investors whereas 
the Hong Kong market is dominated by institutional investors (HKEx, 2016). This allows 
me to contrast institutional and individual investors’ capability to incorporate firm-
specific information. Xu and Wan (2015) show that, during the two years from April 
2010 to April 2012 in mainland China, 97.3% of the futures volumes were executed by 
individual investors, whereas 2.7 % of the volumes were executed by institutional 
investors. Given the short history of the local market, Chinese investors possess less 
trading experience and hence the level of sophistication is lower than those investors in 
                                                 
21 Hong Kong Stock Exchange launched the lending and marginal trading programme earlier than the 
Chinese Stock Exchange. In the Hong Kong market, the stock exchange introduced a pilot program in 
January 1994 with 17 stocks that may be short-sold for regulated short-selling. For the mainland Chinese 
market, since 31 March 2010, the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has approved the margin 




developed markets (Ng and Wu, 2007). There are two types of capital control in the 
Chinese market22, and such controls better segment individual and institutional investors.  
4.1 Primary tests 
My primary hypothesis is that there is an asymmetric impact of optimistic and pessimistic 
news because of the change in short-sale constraints. I posit that, with the relaxation of 
short-sale constrains, investors are offered more opportunities to impound negative 
information and this leads to different levels of return synchronicity. In detail, given that 
institutional investors have a greater ability to execute short-sale orders, I expect a 
significant and relatively larger (smaller) synchronicity difference between shortable and 
non-shortable shares in the markets that are dominated by institutional investors (H-share 
market) than individual investors (A-share market).  
H1: Shortable and non-shortable shares present different levels of return synchronicity 
in the A-share and H-share markets. 
H1a: The magnitude of difference is larger in the H-share market than in the A-share 
market. 
The lifting of short-sale constraints is expected to encourage the incorporation of negative 
information at both the market and firm level. Nonetheless, the preference for a certain 
type of information may depend on investor type. Institutional (individual) investors trade 
more on firm-specific (market-wide) information (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). When 
they are allowed to short sell, institutional (individual) investors are conjectured to 
incorporate more firm-specific (market-wide) negative information. In other words, the 
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return synchronicity of shortable shares is relatively higher (lower) than non-shortable 
shares in markets where individual investors (institutional investors) dominate.  
H1b: Shortable shares show a higher (lower) stock return synchronicity than non-
shortable shares in A- (H-) share market.  
4.2 Robustness tests  
To further support my hypotheses above, several robustness tests are established. The 
first test is derived from the liquidity commonality literature. Empirical evidence shows 
that liquidity commonality is a systematic risk factor and is priced in equity markets 
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Chen, 2005; Sawka, 2006; 
Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). Influential factors include but are not limited to funding 
constraints from financial intermediaries in market downturns (e.g., Coughenour and 
Saad, 2004; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; 
Næs, Skjeltorp, and Odegaard, 2011; Rosch and Kaserer, 2013; Comerton-forde, 
Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes, 2010), the level of institutional ownership 
and the correlated trading activity (e.g., Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, 
and Starks, 2009), investor sentiment (Huberman and Halka, 2001; Karolyi, Lee, and Van 
Dijk, 2012), and the information environment (e.g., Liang and Wei, 2012; Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad, 2007; Brockman, Chung, and Pérignon, 2009, Karolyi, Lee, and 
van Dijk, 2012; Dang, Moshirian, Wee, and Zhang, 2015). The literature suggests that 
liquidity commonality is higher in markets with more correlated trading, low 
transparency and larger proportion of noise traders.  
The market is likely to exhibit more correlated trading when most investors are individual 
investors since they trade with similar information (i.e., market-wide information). 




traders because of the lack of financial knowledge and skills. Individual investors in the 
mainland Chinese market also show herding behaviour (Tan, Chiang, Mason, and Nelling, 
2008). Therefore, the liquidity commonality of shortable shares is expected to be higher 
than non-shortable shares in the market dominated by individual investors. Conversely, 
institutional investors possess better skills to deal with firm-specific information, thus the 
liquidity commonality of shortable shares is expected to be lower than non-shortable 
shares. In conclusion, I posit that shortable A- (H-) shares show a higher (lower) liquidity 
commonality than non-shortable shares. 
H2: Shortable shares show a higher (lower) stock liquidity commonality than 
nonshortable shares in A- (H-) share market. 
Additionally, I conduct separate tests to observe individual and institutional investors’ 
trading behaviour on days with market-wide and firm-specific negative information. 
Trading volumes are employed as a proxy to measure individual and institutional 
investors’ responses. It is expected that on days with market-wide negative information, 
the trading volumes of shortable A-shares are higher than non-shortable A-shares. In the 
H-share market, no significant difference is expected since institutional investors tend to 
trade on firm-specific negative information. 
H3: On days with market-wide negative news, trading volumes of shortable A- shares 
are higher than non-shortable A-shares. 
For dual-listed companies, the release of firm-specific information is the same. Therefore, 
to test institutional and individual investors’ different responses to the same pieces of 
information, I conduct a paired t test to compare the trading volumes between A- and H- 
shares. In this way, I control for firm-level characteristics. Given that investors in the H-




when shares are shortable, I posit that on days with firm-specific negative information, 
the trading volumes of H-shares are higher than their counterparts in the A-share market. 
H4: On days with firm-specific negative information, trading volumes of H-shares are 
larger than the corresponding A-shares. 
4.3 Short-sale constraints and corporate governance  
Finally, I introduce the role that corporate governance might play when interacting with 
the short-sale constraints. A stronger corporate governance structure is positively 
associated with better information disclosure (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Gul, 
Kim and Qiu, 2010; Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen, 2012). Improved information 
disclosure could encourage investors’ willingness to incorporate firm-specific 
information. That is, without short-sale constraints, investors are more willing to 
impound firm-specific negative information within a better corporate governance 
environment. Consequently, in the H-share market, I expect an increased willingness to 
incorporate firm-specific negative information on companies with stronger corporate 
governance structure. In other words, the asymmetric impact of positive and negative 
news is enlarged. Nevertheless, an improved firm-level information environment is not 
A-share investors’ primary concern when they short-sell because of their reliance on 
market-wide negative information. As a result, I expect to observe no significant joint 
impact in the A-share market.  
H5: The return synchronicity difference between shortable and non-shortable shares 
increases among firms with better corporate governance in the H-share market, 













5 Data and Methodology  
This chapter discusses the data and methodology used in the research. The first section 
covers the sample period, variables and data sources. The second section presents the 
methodologies employed for the main and robustness tests.  
5.1 Data  
This research covers a ten-year sample period from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 
2014. I include 86 firms incorporated in China and simultaneously listed on the mainland 
China and Hong Kong markets. My sample period contains a regulation change (i.e., the 
relaxation of short-sale constraints) in mainland China at the beginning of 2010. I obtain 
the daily closing price, market indices, daily bid and ask prices, trading volumes and other 
firm control variables from DataStream and China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR). The daily short-sale information is collected from Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, and Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The corporate 
governance related variables are obtained from the CSMAR database. To differentiate 
between firm-specific and market-wide news, I collect the daily news data from Thomson 
Reuters News Analytics (TRNA). TRNA provides the intraday news articles, indicates 
the predominant sentiment class23  (positive versus negative), and displays relevance 
scores24 that range from zero to one. In the TRNA database, news is recorded in real time, 
                                                 
23 Sentiment class equal to “1”indicates a piece of positive news and sentiment class equal to “-1” indicates 
a piece of negative news. 
24 The relevance score is calculated by comparing the relative number of occurrences of assets with the 
number of occurrences of other organizations within the text of the item. In addition, if the asset is 
mentioned in the headline, the relevance is set to one. For stories with multiple assets, the asset with the 
most mentions will have the highest relevance. An asset with a lower number of mentions will have a lower 




seven days a week. However, the stock exchanges operate only from Monday to Friday. 
Therefore, for all news released on Saturday, Sunday and after hours on Friday, I treat it 
as news that would influence trading activity on Monday. I define a firm with firm-
specific negative news on a day based on the following criteria. First, I filter the firm-
specific news items with a relevance score greater than or equal to 0.8 and the number of 
relevant firms25 equal to or less than 3. Second, I calculate the daily relevance weighted 
sentiment score for each firm. Third, firms with a negative daily average sentiment score 
are defined as firms with firm-specific negative news on that day. On the other hand, days 
with market-wide negative news are estimated by a significant drop of market index on 
that day. A significant market index drop is defined as at least one per cent decrease in 
one day. 
5.1.1 Stock return synchronicity and stock liquidity commonality 
I obtain individual stocks’ returns and market return from DataStream and CSMAR. 
Following Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg’s (2015) work, return synchronicity (SYNC) is 
then estimated by regressing daily stock returns on daily market returns. To measure 
liquidity, I use the percentage spread as a proxy. Like Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang (2015), 
individual stock’s daily spread is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the daily trading price and the midpoint of the bid and ask prices, which is then 
divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. Market liquidity is defined as the 
equally weighted average of all daily individual stock liquidity in the market. The 
liquidity commonality (Liqcom) is calculated in a similar way to the return synchronicity. 
The detailed models are presented in the methodology section below. 
                                                 
25 In the TRNA database, the field “Number of companies” indicates the total number of companies 
mentioned in each news item. It is useful to determine if a pieces of news influence one company only or 




5.1.2 Control variables used in the return synchronicity and liquidity 
commonality regressions 
Following Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang (2015) and a number of prior papers (e.g., 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hammed, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), 
I control for a series of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to affect stock return 
synchronicity and liquidity commonality in the regression analysis. All controls are 
measured on a yearly basis, including log of total assets (Size), the annualized standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns (Volatility), the log of stock price at the end of the 
year (Price), annual returns (Return) and annual turnover (Turnover). I also control for 
the price to book ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets (TDROA) and leverage ratio 
(Leverage) discussed in Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg (2015). Year dummies are 
included to control for systematic time variations. The definitions of firm-specific 
characteristic variables are provided in Appendix A.  
5.1.3 Variables in the robustness check  
The daily trading volumes are used as a proxy to capture investors’ responses towards 
firm-specific and market-wide negative news. The data of daily trading volumes and 
turnover are collected from DataStream. The data for news related variables are obtained 
from Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA). Thomson Reuters News Analytics 
database is powered by a unique processing system from a linguistics technology 
innovator. It provides a real-time numerical insight into the events in the news in a format 
that can be directly calculated by algorithmic trading systems. News items are scored 
individually for every company mentioned in the news. The numerical values I use in this 
research are the relevance score and the sentiment score. The relevance score is calculated 




companies. Its value is within a range from zero to one. Sentiment indicates the tone of 
news in a positive, neutral or negative manner. Negative news is defined as a news item 
with a negative sentiment score. Because of the release of multiple firm-specific news on 
one day, I work out the daily relevance weighted sentiment score. I define the firm-
specific negative news in three steps. First, I find all the firm-specific news items. They 
are defined as a relevance score above or equal to 0.8 and the number of relevant firms 
no greater than 3. Second, I convert the intra-day score to a daily score by calculating the 
daily relevance weighted sentiment score for each firm. Third, I define firms with a 
negative daily average sentiment score as firms with firm-specific negative news on that 
day. To define days with market-wide negative news, I use a minimum one per cent 
reduction of market index in one day as a proxy. Control variables include log of total 
assets (Size), lagged trading volumes (TVt-1), liquidity (Liquidity), lagged liquidity 
(Liquidityt-1), the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns (Volatility), the 
log of stock price at the end of the year (Price), annual returns (Return), price to book 
ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets (TDROA), leverage ratio (Leverage), and year 
dummies.   
Better corporate governance structure adds credibility to a firm's information disclosure 
and, consequently, enhances investors’ willingness to trade on such information. The 
corporate governance variables included in my sample are a state-owned enterprises 
26(SOE) dummy, the percentage of independent directors on the board (Indep), the 
number of members on the supervisory board (Supervisory), the size of the management 
team (Management), a CEO_Chair dummy27 , and a Linktop10 dummy28 . From the 
corporate fraud perspective, Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui (2006) find that SOEs are charged 
                                                 
26 SOE equals one if the company is state-owned and zero otherwise. 
27 CEO_chairman equals one if CEO is also chairman and zero otherwise. 




with being responsible for financial statement fraud. However, the proportion of outside 
directors is negatively related to fraud. Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014) document 
improved corporate transparency when the proportion of indirect independent directors 
increases. The supervisory board is considered a monitoring mechanism. Nevertheless, 
because of the unique institutional environment in China, the effectiveness of the 
supervisory board is in doubt (Xu and Lin, 2016). They point out that the Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) has the power to nominate the 
members of directory and supervisory boards for SOEs. CEO duality is argued to be a 
double-edged sword by Finkelstein and D’aveni (1994). On one hand, the duality of CEO 
can establish a clear leadership duty based on organization theory. On the other hand, 
CEO duality creates agency problems and reduces monitoring effectiveness (Grove, 
Patelli, and Victoravich, 2011).  
5.2 Methodology  
5.2.1 Return synchronicity 
The primary variable of interest in the regression is return synchronicity. It is widely used 
to estimate the amount of firm-specific information being incorporated into stock prices. 
It is important to notice that there is a significant mutual feedback of information on 
cross-listed stocks (Xu and Fung, 2002). The prices of dual-listed stocks are co-integrated 
and mutually adjusting (Su and Chong, 2007). Therefore, to measure the co-movement 
in stock returns for each firm in a given year, I regress each stock’s daily return on the 
contemporaneous, lead and lagged returns of the local and the cross-listed foreign 
markets, which is indicated below  
 





Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents daily stock return of stock i on day t which is for either A- or H- 
shares. 𝑅𝐴,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐻,𝑡  are the market returns on the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong 
markets on day t, respectively.  
The value of R2 is bounded by zero and one. When used as the dependent variable in the 
regression analysis, it is suggested that it be transformed into continuous values. 
Following Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), I take the logistic transformation of the R2 








𝑖,𝑡)        (2) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the return commonality of stock i in year t. 𝑅
2
𝑖,𝑡 is the coefficient of 
determination from equation (1) for firm i in year. The log transformation is to replace a 
bounded dependent variable with an unbounded continuous variable. 
 
5.2.2 Liquidity commonality  
I use an analogous procedure to estimate co-movement in stock liquidity. In detail, stock 
liquidity co-movement is measured by the R2 from the regression of an individual stock’s 
daily liquidity change on the market’s daily liquidity change. Liquidity is measured by 
the daily percentage quoted spread. This spread is defined as twice the absolute value of 
difference between the trading price and the mid-point of the bid and ask prices, which is 




as the equally weighted average of all daily individual stock liquidity. To construct the 
liquidity commonality variable, I regress each stock’s daily liquidity on the 
contemporaneous, lead and lagged liquidity of the local and the cross-listed foreign 
markets as follows 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐴,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐴,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐴,𝑡−1+𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐻,𝑡+1 +
                𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐻,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (3) 
 
Where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the liquidity of stock i on day t which is for either A- or H- shares. 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐴,𝑡 
and 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐻,𝑡 are the equally weighted mainland Chinese and Hong Kong markets liquidity 
on day t, respectively.  
Like the return commonality, I take the logistic transformation of the R2 measures as log 
(𝑅2𝑖,𝑡/(1 − 𝑅
2
𝑖,𝑡) when they are used as the dependent variables in the empirical analysis. 
 




𝑖,𝑡)        (4) 
 
Where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the liquidity commonality of stock i in year t. 𝑅
2
𝑖,𝑡 is the coefficient 




5.2.3 The impact of short-selling constraints on return synchronicity and 
liquidity commonality 
To examine the impact of short-sale constraints on return synchronicity and liquidity 
commonality, I include a dummy variable that indicates the short-sale information for 
stocks i in year t. During the sample period, stocks can be deleted or added to the 
designated list. I define the stocks that are allowed to short-sell in year t as the stocks stay 
in the designated list for at least three quarters in a given year. A full report of short-sale 
allowance for each stock is in appendix C. 
 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (5) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the return synchronicity of a stock i in year t which is for either A- or 
H- shares from equation (2). 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-
selling is allowed and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the firm-level control variables, 
including firm size (Size), return volatility (Volatility), price (Price), annual returns 
(Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets 
(TDROA), and leverage ratio (Leverage). Year dummies are included to control for 
systematic time variations. The definitions of the control variables are given in Appendix 
A. 
 





Where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the liquidity commonality of a stock i in year t, which is either A- or 
H- shares from equation (4). 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-
selling is allowed and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the firm-level control variables, 
including firm size (Size), return volatility (Volatility), price (Price), annual returns 
(Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets 
(TDROA), leverage ratio (Leverage), and year dummies (not reported). 
5.2.4 The impact of short-selling constraints on trading volumes on days 
with negative news 
I propose that investors in the A-share market respond more to market-wide negative 
information whereas investors in the H-share market respond more to firm-specific 
negative information. Therefore, I expect larger trading volumes among shortable shares 
than non-shortable shares on the A-share market when market-wide negative news is 
released. I expect no such significant difference in the H-share market. Days with market-
wide negative information are defined as a significant drop of the market index in one 
day (i.e., at least a 1% drop). 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (7) 
 
Where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the trading volume for firm i in day t, which is either A- 
or H- shares. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed 
and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are firm-level control variables. They are firm size (Size), 




price to book ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets (TDROA), leverage (Leverage), 
annual returns (Return), return volatility (Volatility), and price (Price). 
To compare trading volumes between A- and H-shares on days with firm-specific 
negative information, I conduct a paired t test since A- and H- shares refer to the same 
company with the identical firm-level characteristics and same firm-level information.  
5.2.5 Robustness check with alternative return synchronicity measures  
I also test my main results with slightly modified measures of stock return synchronicity 
as indicated below. Equation (8) calculates return synchronicity by regressing each 
stock’s daily return on the contemporaneous, lead and lagged return of only the local 
market. Equation (9) regresses each stock’s daily return on the contemporaneous, and 
lagged local market return. Equation (10) is similar to equation (1) but without the lead 
market returns. 
 
𝑅𝑖(𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻),𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (8)                                                     
𝑅𝑖(𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻),𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝐻,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (9)                                                     
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝑅𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐻,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (10) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents daily stock return of stock i on day t, which is either A- or H- shares. 
𝑅𝐴,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐻,𝑡  are the market returns on the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong markets 




5.2.6 Short-sale constraints and corporate governance  
A firm’s corporate governance structure can influence the quality of information 
disclosure and thus investors’ response to negative information. This may further affect 
the asymmetric impact of positive and negative information on stock return synchronicity. 
To examine the additional effect of corporate governance factors on the relationship 
between short-sale constraints and stock return synchronicity, I rerun model (5) with the 
interaction terms between the corporate governance and the short sale constraints.  
 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (11)  
 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the return synchronicity of a stock i in year t, which is either A- or H- 
shares from equation (2). 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-
selling is allowed and zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡  are the firm-level corporate governance variables, including the state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) dummy, the percentage of independent directors on board (Indep), the 
number of members on the supervisory board (Supervisory), the size of management 
team (Management), a CEO_Chair dummy, and a Linktop10 dummy.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are firm-level control variables, including firm size (Size), return volatility 
(Volatility), price (Price), annual returns (Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book 













6 Empirical Results 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics and the results from the univariate tests 
and multiple-linear regression analyses. In the first section, I provide an overview of my 
sample. In section two, I conduct simple univariate tests to check the return synchronicity 
difference (i.e., A-shares versus H-shares; shortable versus non-shortable shares). 
According to Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg (2015), A-shares impound more market-wide 
information whereas H-shares impound more firm-specific information. In other words, 
return synchronicity of A-shares is higher than H-shares. I expect a like pattern using a 
similar sample within a different time horizon. By analogy, I posit that A-shares (H-
shares) impound more market-wide (firm-specific) negative information when they are 
allowed to be short-sold. Section three summarizes the empirical results of regression 
analyses that support the existence of an asymmetric impact of positive and negative 
information. Section four provides a series robustness tests, including the liquidity 
commonality difference because of the change of short-sale constraints, a comparison of 
trading volumes between shortable and non-shortable shares on days with market-wide 
negative information, and a comparison of trading volumes between A-shares and H-
shares on days with firm-specific negative information, to support the interpretation of 
the regression results. The last section tests the incremental effect that the corporate 






6.1 Descriptive data  
My sample includes 86 dual-listed companies traded as A-shares in mainland China and 
H-shares in Hong Kong. The industry categories are shown in Panel A of Table 6.1 and 
the number of A- and H- shares’ IPOs from 1991 to 2014 is presented in Panel B. A 
complete report of the basic information for each company is presented in Appendix B. 
The industry is classification is according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). Nearly half of the dual-listed companies in my sample operate in the 
manufacturing industry. Over 30 per cent of the companies are in the finance and 
transportation industries. The rest of the industries are utilities, construction, retail and 
real estate. The earliest listing on the mainland Chinese Stock Exchange in my sample is 
1991, when SSE and SZSE were established. The Chinese companies have listed on the 
Hong Kong market since 1993. There were 13 companies that went IPO on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange in 1997. This large number of listings may have been encouraged 
by the transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to the People’s 
Republic of China. The year 2007 was a peak for A-shares listing when 16 companies 
listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. That year, 2007, is important to Chinese stock 
market history because the market experienced a big stock bubble. The Shanghai 









Table 6.1  
Descriptive summary of A- and H-shares.  
Panel A: Number of Stocks by Industry 
Name Number of shares Percentage 
Mining 9 10.47% 
Manufacturing 39 45.35% 
Utilities 4 4.65% 
Construction 4 4.65% 
Retail 1 1.16% 
Transportation 12 13.95% 
Finance 15 17.44% 
Real estate 2 2.33% 
Total  86 100.00% 
 
Panel B: Number of Stocks by the year of IPO  
Year Number of A-shares Number of H-shares 
1991 1 0 
1993 4 6 
1994 6 5 
1995 5 1 
1996 2 6 
1997 4 13 
1998 2 2 
1999 1 1 
2000 3 2 
2001 5 1 
2002 4 2 
2003 3 3 
2004 0 5 
2005 1 5 
2006 6 6 
2007 16 4 
2008 5 3 
2009 3 4 
2010 5 5 
2011 4 4 
2012 6 4 
2013 0 1 
2014 0 3 







Table 6.2  
Percentage of shortable and non-shortable A- and H-shares from 2005 to 2014. 
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
A Non-shortable shares 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 Shortable shares 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
       
H Non-shortable shares 33.96% 30.51% 22.58% 20.00% 28.17% 
  Shortable shares 66.04% 69.49% 77.42% 80.00% 71.83% 
       
    2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
A Non-shortable shares 59.46% 58.97% 45.24% 33.33% 27.71% 
 Shortable shares 40.54% 41.03% 54.76% 66.67% 72.29% 
       
H Non-shortable shares 18.67% 16.67% 21.95% 22.89% 17.44% 
  Shortable shares 81.33% 83.33% 78.05% 77.11% 82.56% 
Note: “A” indicates A-shares “H” indicates H-shares 
As discussed in the background section, shares can be added to or deleted from the 
designated list within a year. To compare the return synchronicity between shortable and 
non-shortable shares on a yearly basis, I define a stock that can be short-sold in a given 
year as a stock staying in the designated list for at least three quarters during a year. Table 
6 describes the percentage of shortable and non-shortable shares for A- and H-shares each 
year from 2005 to 2014. As shown in Table 6.2, A-shares were completely prohibited 
from short selling until 2009. In 2010, 40.54% of the A-shares were permitted to short 
sell. The percentage increased to 72.29% in 2014. Unlike A-shares, shares on the Hong 
Kong market could be short sold since 1994. In 2005, roughly 66% of the H-shares in my 
sample were allowed to short-sell. The percentage of shortable shares reached 83.33% in 
2011 and decreased slightly to 82.56% in 2014. Compared with the Hong Kong market, 
the mainland Chinese market imposes more restrictions on short-selling. This semi-open 
short-selling mechanism applying to certain stocks makes it possible to compare the 
return synchronicity between shortable and non-shortable shares in a single market. At 
the same time, it allows me to compare the impact of short-sale constraints with the same 




Table 6.3  
Descriptive statistics of return synchronicity and firm characteristics.  
This table shows descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
regression analysis. SYNC_A is the annual return synchronicity for A-shares. SYNC_H is the 
annual return synchronicity for H-shares. Size is the firm Size. Volatility is the annual stock return 
volatility. Price is the annual stock price. Return is the annual stock return. Turnover is the annual 
stock turnover. PB is the price to book ratio. STDROA is the volatility of return on assets. 
Leverage is the leverage ratio. The definition of variables is given in Appendix A. 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SYNC_A 779 -0.361 0.811 -3.281 1.463 
SYNC_H 687 -0.688 0.994 -4.699 5.233 
Size 963 17.658 2.278 13.068 23.358 
Volatility_A 767 0.117 0.056 0.033 0.301 
Price_A 735 2.105 0.784 0.815 4.184 
Return_A 682 0.001 0.595 -1.616 1.647 
Turnover_A 774 1.846 1.809 0.037 10.004 
Volatility_H 673 0.119 0.049 0.040 0.278 
Price_H 649 1.774 0.994 -0.236 4.187 
Return_H 605 0.123 0.569 -1.378 1.539 
Turnover_H 677 2.492 2.182 0.253 12.873 
PB 771 2.627 2.434 -1.817 16.336 
STDROA 752 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.089 
Leverage 788 0.532 0.242 0.027 0.972 
 
I summarise the descriptive statistics of return synchronicity and the firm-level 
characteristics in Table 6.3. The value of firm-specific information is measured by SYNC 
estimated from equation (2). It is important to notice first that there is a difference 
between A- and H-shares in terms of firm-specific information impounded into the stock 
prices. The return synchronicity of A-shares is higher than that of H-shares. The degree 
of return synchronicity and the level of firm-specific information is inversely related, 
suggesting less firm-specific information has been incorporated into A-share prices. 
Given that the A- (H-) share market is dominated by individual (institutional) investors 
(HKEx, 2016), it can be interpreted that individual investors impound less firm-specific 
information into stock prices than institutional investors. A univariate test will be 




shares is greater than the price of their counterparts29. This is consistent with the fact that 
there is a price disparity between dual-listed AH shares. H-shares are discounted relative 
to A-shares. Various explanations have been provided for this price discrepancy. Sun and 
Tong (2000) summarize the possible reasons: different demand30, the liquidity problem, 
and information asymmetry. The average leverage ratio for these cross-listed firms is 
approximately 0.532. To make a better comparison, I extend the descriptive statistics to 
the yearly basis.  
As shown in Table 6.4, the return synchronicity of A- and H-shares reached its highest 
point and turned positive in 2008, indicating the return of A- and H-share co-move more 
closely with the market indices during the global financial crisis. This is consistent with 
the discussion in chapter 3. During a financial crisis, investors tend to trade on market-
wide information, resulting in a higher return synchronicity. On a yearly basis, the 
average prices of A-shares are relatively higher than H-shares from 2005 to 2013, but the 
price of A-shares is slightly at a discount relative to H-shares in 2014. This can be 
explained by the Shangahai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program launched in 2014. Under 
the program, investors in the segmented markets were able to trade in both markets. This 
mutual market strategy further opens up the A-share market to overseas investors and 
allows more participation of Chinese retail and institutional investors in the Hong Kong 
market. The mean volatility of A-shares is larger than of H-shares in most years 
throughout the sampling period. This may be explained by the different ownership 
structure (institutional versus individual investors). Foucault, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) 
                                                 
29 Prices of A- and H-shares are expressed in RMB. 
30 The “different demand” refers to the demand elasticity. In the mainland Chinese market, listing quotas 
are set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The issue of foreign shares needs additional 
approval. Moreover, there are limited investment options for Chinese investors and the deposit rate is not 
attractive to Chinese citizens. Therefore, the demand elasticity is very low. In contrast, investors from Hong 




show that individual investor’s trading activity is positively related to stock volatility 
since they are considered as noise or speculative traders. The average leverage ratio of 
these dual-listed companies was relatively lower (0.452) in 2004 and increased to 0.527 
in 2014. The mean price to book ratio fluctuated during the sample period, from a low of 
1.576 in 2013 to a high of 6.533 in 2007. In terms of turnover, H-shares are always greater 
than A-shares, indicating H-shares are more liquid than their counterparts.  
The correlation matrix for the variables used in the primary test is tabulated in Table 6.5. 
The return synchronicity of A-shares and H-shares is highly co-correlated (ρ=0.705). The 
return synchronicity of A- and H-shares has a close positive relationship with firm size, 
suggesting larger firms have higher return synchronicity. The correlations between return 





Table 6.4  
Descriptive statistics of return synchronicity and firm characteristics on an annual basis  
This table shows yearly descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in 
the regression analysis. SYNC_A is the annual return synchronicity for A-shares. SYNC_H is 
the annual return synchronicity for H-shares. Size is the firm size. Volatility is the annual stock 
return volatility. Price is the annual stock price. Return is the annual stock return. Turnover is the 
annual stock turnover. PB is the price to book ratio. STDROA is the volatility of return on assets. 
Leverage is the leverage ratio. The definition of variables is given in Appendix A. 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
SYNC_A -0.545 -1.244 -0.449 0.446 -0.031 
SYNC_H -1.686 -1.107 -0.589 0.313 -0.304 
Size 16.882 17.084 17.522 17.667 17.798 
Volatility_A 0.108 0.116 0.179 0.216 0.140 
Price_A 1.817 1.531 2.004 3.062 1.883 
Return_A -0.098 -0.185 0.528 1.023 -1.107 
Turnover_A 1.448 2.222 2.998 1.716 3.049 
Volatility_H 0.081 0.107 0.136 0.181 0.158 
Price_H 1.371 1.316 1.838 2.429 1.490 
Return_H -0.022 0.007 0.611 0.663 -0.857 
Turnover_H 2.592 2.997 3.794 3.018 3.327 
PB 1.606 2.707 6.533 2.034 3.609 
STDROA 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.016 
Leverage 0.452 0.527 0.530 0.561 0.572 
      
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
SYNC_A -0.202 -0.064 -0.153 -0.524 -1.022 
SYNC_H -0.439 -0.035 -0.744 -0.848 -1.283 
Size 18.005 18.144 18.248 18.353 18.482 
Volatility_A 0.115 0.079 0.088 0.109 0.088 
Price_A 2.489 2.292 1.948 1.993 1.920 
Return_A 0.658 -0.099 -0.350 0.047 -0.041 
Turnover_A 1.821 1.500 1.161 1.566 1.763 
Volatility_H 0.098 0.150 0.100 0.097 0.090 
Price_H 2.100 2.169 1.758 1.930 1.930 
Return_H 0.628 0.126 -0.407 0.171 0.051 
Turnover_H 1.995 1.762 1.524 1.647 1.638 
PB 3.000 1.897 1.885 1.576 2.113 
STDROA 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 





Table 6.5  
Correlation matrix of return synchronicity and firm characteristics. 
SYNC_A is the annual return synchronicity for A-shares. SYNC_H is the annual return synchronicity for H-shares. Size is the firm size. Volatility is the annual 
stock return volatility. Price is the annual stock price. Return is the annual stock return. Turnover is the annual stock turnover. PB is the price to book ratio. 
STDROA is the volatility of return on assets. Leverage is the leverage ratio. The definition of variables is given in Appendix A. 
 
  SYNC_A SYNC_H Size Volatility_A Price_A Return_A Turnover_A         
SYNC_A 1       
SYNC_H 0.705 1      
Size 0.474 0.513 1     
Volatility_A 0.052 0.17 -0.194 1    
Price_A 0.237 0.271 0.046 0.274 1   
Return_A 0.007 0.067 -0.047 0.302 0.436 1  
Turnover_A -0.154 -0.100 -0.339 0.286 0.184 0.024 1 
Volatility_H 0.164 0.212 -0.210 0.570 0.223 0.029 0.250 
Price_H 0.279 0.353 0.321 0.109 0.864 0.299 0.180 
Return_H -0.010 0.076 -0.072 0.215 0.355 0.873 0.020 
Turnover_H -0.014 -0.021 -0.292 0.347 0.181 0.038 0.400 
PB -0.183 -0.100 -0.218 0.251 0.111 0.102 0.250 
STDROA -0.162 -0.086 -0.304 0.214 0.154 0.137 0.130 
Leverage 0.117 0.187 0.483 -0.034 -0.076 -0.033 -0.030         
        
 Volatility_H Price_H Return_H Turnover_H PB STDROA Leverage 
Volatility_H 1       
Price_H 0.095 1      
Return_H 0.090 0.284 1     
Turnover_H 0.366 0.086 0.056 1    
PB 0.195 0.009 0.144 0.156 1   
STDROA 0.217 0.059 0.150 0.155 0.113 1  




6.2 Univariate tests 
To confirm my primary findings in the descriptive summary, I conduct a univariate test 
on a yearly basis to check the return synchronicity difference between A- and H-shares. 
As shown in Table 6.6, the t-tests support the results obtained in the previous section. 
During most years in my sample, the return synchronicity of A-shares is statistically 
higher than H-shares. These results can be interpreted as the A-share market impounding 
more market wide information whereas the H-share market impounds more firm-specific 
information into stock prices. With this logic, I propose that shortable A-shares (H-shares) 
impound more market-wide (firm-specific) negative information into prices than non-
shortable A-shares (H-shares).  
Table 6.6 
Univariate tests for dual-listed stocks’ return synchronicity estimations.  
This table presents the average return synchronicity of A-shares and H-shares in each year. “A-
H” is the return synchronicity difference between A-shares and H-shares. Superscripts *, **, and 
*** denote the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
SYNC_A -0.545 -1.244 -0.449 0.446 -0.031 
SYNC_H -1.686 -1.107 -0.589 0.313 -0.304 
A-H 1.142*** -0.137 0.140 0.133 0.272** 
T-test (7.955) (-0.697) (1.090) (0.944) (1.930) 
      
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
SYNC_A -0.202 -0.064 -0.153 -0.524 -1.022 
SYNC_H -0.439 -0.035 -0.744 -0.848 -1.283 
A-H 0.237** -0.029 0.591*** 0.325*** 0.260** 
T-test (1.995) (-0.286) (3.966) (2.492) (1.967) 
 
Taking one step back, I observe different levels of return synchronicity between shortable 
and non-shortable shares. Therefore, I conduct univariate tests to examine the effect of 
short-sale constraints on stock return synchronicity (Table 6.7). I notice that the return 
synchronicity for shortable A-shares is statistically significantly higher than non-




information than non-shortable shares. However, there is no statistically significant 
difference in return synchronicity for H-shares.  
Table 6.7 
Univariate tests for stock return synchronicity estimations and short-sale constraints.  
This table presents the difference in return synchronicity between shortable and non-shortable 
shares for both A- and H-shares. “Diff SYNC_A” is equal to SYNC_A of shortable shares minus 
SYNC_A of non-shortable shares; “Diff SYNC_H” is equal to SYNC_H of shortable shares 
minus SYNC_H of non-shortable shares. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the significance 
levels 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Diff SYNC_A  0.640*** 0.504*** 0.847*** 0.758*** 0.861*** 
 (3.954) (4.805) (5.859) (4.678) (5.075) 
      
Diff SYNC_H  -0.469 -0.085 -0.167 -0.556** -0.539 
  (-1.372) (-0.264) (-0.442) (-1.961) (-1.574) 
 
These results are essential for the following regression analyses. In the next section, I first 
test the difference of return synchronicity between shortable and non-shortable shares 
after controlling for a series of firm-level characteristics. Secondly, I posit that the 
magnitude of change is greater in markets with a larger proportion of institutional 
investors because roughly 75% of short-sale orders are executed by institutional investors 
rather than retail investors (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008). Thirdly, the relaxation of 
short-sales is expected to result in an increase (decrease) in return synchronicity in the A- 
(H-) share market. That is, individual investors in the A-share market tend to impound 
market-wide negative information whereas institutional investors in the H-shares market 






6.3 Multiple linear regression analysis  
In this section, a number of multiple linear regressions are reported. Since short-selling 
was permitted in March 2010 on the mainland Chinese market, I set the sample period to 
start from 2010 to make a better comparison between the A- and H-share markets (Table 
6.8). A separate regression for H-shares between 2005 and 2009 are presented in Table 
6.9. 
Table 6.8 presents multivariate regression results based on equation (5) using different 
sets of explanatory variables. In column (1), I include the set of variables (size, volatility, 
price, return, and turnover) used in Dang, Moshirian, and Zhang’s (2015) paper. In 
column (2), I also include the variables price to book ratio, volatility of return on assets, 
and leverage according to Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg (2015). To correct for firm-level 
clustering, in column (3) I rerun the regression in column (2) but estimate the standard 
errors with a robust option. Starting with column (1), I find that the coefficient estimate 
of Short is significant on both A- and H-share markets when controlled for size, volatility, 
price, return and turnover. This indicates a significant impact of short-selling on stock 
return synchronicity. In addition, the magnitude of the short-selling impact is larger on 
the H-share market than the A-share market (0.494 versus 0.305), suggesting institutional 
investors possess a stronger ability to process negative information. The coefficient 
estimate of Short is significantly positive on the A-share market, but it is significantly 
negative on the H-share market. This suggests that, when stocks are allowed to short-sell, 
more market-wide negative information is impounded into prices on the A-share market 
whereas more firm-specific negative information is impounded into the stock prices on 
the H-share market. I interpret these results as individual (institutional) investors prefer 




effect of short-selling is more pronounced when controlled for the more firm-specific 
characteristics (i.e., PB, STDROA and leverage).  
During 2005 to 2009, short-selling was totally banned on the mainland Chinese market 
but was partially open to some H-shares in the designated list. Table 6.9 reports the 
impact of short-selling on return synchronicity on the Hong Kong market using the 
alternative sample period 2005 to 2009. The coefficient estimate of Short is positive in 
column (1) with a short list of controls and becomes insignificant after controlling for the 
full set of firm-specific variables. This sample period includes the financial crisis that 
started in 2007 which exerted adverse shocks on all firms. During recessions, investors’ 
decisions are more likely to be influenced by market-wide negative news than at other 
times. That is, institutional investors tend to consider firm-specific and market-wide 
negative information at the same time. Therefore, investors’ balanced consideration of 
firm-specific negative information relative to the market-wide negative information may 













Table 6.8  
Short-sale constraints and return synchronicity. 
This table reports the regressions of stocks’ return synchronicity on short-sale constraints at the 
firm level. The regression model is as follows: 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the logistic transformation of return synchronicity for firm i in year t. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed, and zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are the firm-level control variables, including firm size (Size), return volatility 
(Volatility), price (Price), annual returns (Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), 
volatility of the return on assets (TDROA), and leverage (Leverage). The definition of variables 
is given in Appendix A. Observations is the number of observations, Adjusted R-squared is the 
adjusted R-squared value, and Year Fixed Effects are included (not reported). Superscripts *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 
2010 to 2014. 
 
Panel A: A-shares 
  A-shares 
Dep. Variable  SYNC_A 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Short 0.305*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 
 (3.450) (3.558) (3.475) 
Size 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
 (5.900) (4.880) (4.390) 
Volatility -2.085** -1.484 -1.484 
 (-2.042) (-1.480) (-0.975) 
Price 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (3.265) (3.254) (3.272) 
Return -0.416*** -0.345*** -0.345*** 
 (-3.407) (-2.858) (-3.023) 
Turnover -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.369) (-0.233) (-0.209) 
PB  -0.045** -0.045* 
  (-2.454) (-1.907) 
STDROA  -6.755*** -6.755** 
  (-2.810) (-2.304) 
Leverage  -0.365** -0.365** 
  (-2.358) (-2.136) 
Constant -2.319*** -1.925*** -1.925*** 
 (-5.454) (-4.235) (-3.787) 
   
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 368 368 368 













Panel B: H-shares 
  H-shares 
Dep. Variable  SYNC_H 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Short -0.494*** -0.584*** -0.584*** 
 (-3.380) (-3.571) (-4.106) 
Size 0.278*** 0.293*** 0.293*** 
 (13.928) (11.527) (12.600) 
Volatility -1.931* -1.588 -1.588 
 (-1.688) (-1.330) (-1.155) 
Price 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
 (3.531) (3.253) (3.026) 
Return -0.199* -0.227* -0.227 
 (-1.664) (-1.817) (-1.525) 
Turnover 0.143*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (3.601) (2.962) (3.145) 
PB  0.012 0.012 
  (0.524) (0.502) 
STDROA  -3.712 -3.712 
  (-1.277) (-1.063) 
Leverage  -0.250 -0.250 
  (-1.335) (-1.288) 
Constant -5.248*** -5.265*** -5.265*** 
 (-13.555) (-11.625) (-11.766) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 309 301 301 




Table 6.9  
Short-sale constraints and H-shares’ return synchronicity during 2005 to 2009. 
This table reports the regressions of stocks’ return synchronicity on short-sale constraints at the 
firm level. The regression model is as follows: 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡is the logistic transformation of return co-movement for firm i in year t. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed, and zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are the firm-level control variables, including firm size (Size), return volatility 
(Volatility), price (Price), annual returns (Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), 
volatility of the return on assets (TDROA), and leverage (Leverage). The definition of variables 
is given in Appendix A. Observations is the number of observations, Adjusted R-squared is the 
adjusted R-squared value, and Year Fixed Effects are included (not reported). Superscripts *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 
2005 to 2009. 
 
 H shares 
Dep. Variables SYNC_H 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Short 0.297* -0.145 -0.145 
 (1.777) (-0.926) (-0.888) 
Size 0.283*** 0.384*** 0.384*** 
 (10.296) (12.378) (12.896) 
Volatility 1.636 2.760** 2.760** 
 (1.402) (2.523) (2.544) 
Price 0.093 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (1.585) (3.004) (2.981) 
Return -0.226* -0.174 -0.174 
 (-1.684) (-1.415) (-1.417) 
Turnover 0.000 -0.016 -0.016 
 (-0.019) (-0.815) (-0.922) 
PB  -0.024 -0.024 
  (-1.404) (-1.594) 
STDROA  -3.053 -3.053 
  (-1.172) (-1.139) 
Leverage  -1.437*** -1.437*** 
  (-7.112) (-6.762) 
Constant -6.957*** -7.720*** -7.720*** 
 (-14.852) (-15.872) (-16.522) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 208 167 167 




All these empirical findings support my first hypothesis. To confirm my conjecture about 
individual and institutional investors’ different trading preferences in processing market-
wide and firm-specific negative information, robustness tests are conducted and are 
reported in the section below. 
6.4 Robustness tests 
In the previous section, I conjecture that A-share investors tend to incorporate more 
market-wide negative information when they are allowed to short-sell. Conversely, H-
share investors tend to incorporate more firm-specific negative information. To test this 
statement, I run a set of robustness tests, including checking the difference in liquidity 
commonality between shortable and non-shortable shares by comparing the trading 
volumes on days with market-wide and firm-specific negative news.  
First, liquidity commonality is tested to observe A- and H-shareholders’ response to 
market-wide and firm-specific information. Prior literature suggests that liquidity 
commonality is higher in markets with more correlated trading (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 
2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2009) or a larger proportion of noise traders (Huberman 
and Halka, 2001). Since individual investors trade more on market-wide information, 
such trading activities on similar information would lead to more correlated trading. Tan, 
Chiang, Mason, and Nelling (2008) show that herding behaviour is prevalent among 
individual investors in mainland China. Also, individual traders are considered noise 
traders compared with institutional investors (Foucault, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2011). 
Therefore, I posit that shortable shares’ liquidity commonality is higher (lower) in the A- 
(H-) share market when the short-sale constraints are lifted.  
Table 6.10 reports the multivariate regression results based on equation (6) with different 




(1), I include the set of variables (size, volatility, price, return, and turnover) used in Dang, 
Moshirian, and Zhang’s (2015) paper. In column (2), I include additional variables (price 
to book ratio, volatility of return on assets, and leverage) based on Li, Brockman, and 
Zurbruegg (2015). In column (3), the regression is the same but I estimate the standard 
errors with a robust option to correct for firm-level clustering. In the A-share market, the 
coefficient estimate of Short is significantly positive using different sets of controls, 
suggesting liquidity commonality is higher among stocks without short-sale constraints. 
In the H-share market, the coefficient estimate of Short is significantly negative when 
controlled for size, volatility, price, return, and turnover. However, it becomes 
insignificant after controlling for PB, STDROA and leverage. This provides weak 
evidence suggesting lower liquidity commonality for stocks that are allowed to short-sell. 





Short-sale constraints and liquidity commonality. 
This table reports the regressions of stocks’ liquidity commonality on short-sale constraints at the 
firm level. The regression model is as follows: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the logistic transformation of liquidity comovement for firm i in year t. 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed, and zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are the firm-level control variables, including firm size (Size), return volatility 
(Volatility), price (Price), annual returns (Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), 
volatility of the return on assets (TDROA), and leverage (Leverage). The definition of variables 
is given in Appendix A. Observations is the number of observations, R-squared is the R-squared 
value, and Year Fixed Effects are included (not reported). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 2010 to 2014. 
 
Panel A: A-shares 
 A-shares 
Dependent Variable Liqcom_A 
  (1) (2) (3) 
      
Short 0.293** 0.275** 0.275** 
 (2.563) (2.399) (2.318) 
Size -0.073*** -0.045 -0.045 
 (-2.750) (-1.434) (-1.594) 
Volatility -0.353 -0.643 -0.643 
 (-0.268) (-0.485) (-0.490) 
Price -0.188*** -0.214*** -0.214*** 
 (-3.038) (-3.337) (-3.770) 
Return 0.052 0.009 0.009 
 (0.330) (0.056) (0.056) 
Turnover 0.010 0.016 0.016 
 (0.265) (0.399) (0.402) 
PB  0.037 0.037* 
  (1.525) (1.870) 
STDROA  4.473 4.473 
  (1.408) (1.632) 
Leverage  -0.104 -0.104 
   (-0.510) (-0.576) 
Constant -1.599*** -2.098*** -2.098*** 
  (-2.913) (-3.491) (-3.673) 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 368 368 368 












Panel B: H-shares 
  H-shares 
Dependent Variable Liqcom_H 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
   
Short -0.316* -0.237 -0.237 
 (-1.966) (-1.324) (-1.155) 
Size -0.054** -0.058** -0.058** 
 (-2.477) (-2.096) (-2.034) 
Volatility -0.050 0.322 0.322 
 (-0.040) (0.246) (0.244) 
Price 0.034 0.042 0.042 
 (0.758) (0.890) (0.841) 
Return 0.059 0.065 0.065 
 (0.451) (0.478) (0.488) 
Turnover -0.028 -0.020 -0.020 
 (-0.648) (-0.435) (-0.475) 
PB  0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
STDROA  -3.943 -3.943* 
  (-1.240) (-1.682) 
Leverage  0.054 0.054 
 
 (0.261) (0.262) 
Constant -2.425*** -2.436*** -2.436*** 
 (-5.694) (-4.915) (-4.856) 
 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 309 301 301 











Table 6.11  
Trading volumes and short-sale constraints on days with market-wide negative information.  
This table reports the regressions of stocks’ percentage change in trading volumes on short-sale constraints 
in market downturn at the firm level. The regression model is as follows: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is the percentage change of trading volumes for firm i in day t. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed, and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are 
the firm-level control variables, including firm size (Size), lagged trading volumes (TVt-1), Liquidity 
(liquidity), lagged liquidity (Liquidityt-1), price to book ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets 
(TDROA), leverage (Leverage), annual returns (Return), return volatility (Volatility), and price (Price). A 
1% drop indicates minimum1% market index drop in one day, 2% drop indicates minimum 2% market 
index drop in one day, and 3% drop indicates minimum 3% market index drop in one day. Observations is 
the number of observations. R-squared is the R-squared value. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 2010 to 2014. 
 
Panel A: A-shares 
 A-shares 
Dep. Variable Percentage change of trading volumes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1% drop 2% drop 3% drop 1% drop 2% drop 3% drop 
Short 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 
 (5.326) (2.792) (3.021) (7.399) (3.482) (3.549) 
Size 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 
 (10.400) (7.549) (4.537) (14.878) (9.095) (6.188) 
TVt-1 -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.025*** 
 (-28.237) (-15.798) (-11.278) (-31.263) (-17.086) (-12.710) 
Liquidity 1.171*** 0.926*** 1.228* 0.711*** 0.611** 0.384 
 (5.318) (3.061) (1.714) (3.102) (1.989) (0.527) 
Liquidityt-1 -0.563* -0.115 -0.54 -1.890*** -1.340** -2.502** 
 (-1.717) (-0.204) (-0.462) (-5.147) (-2.212) (-2.027) 
PB    -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 
   (-2.974) (0.529) (0.737) 
STDROA    -0.080* -0.174** -0.227 
 
   (-1.954) (-2.145) (-1.505) 
leverage    0.000 -0.002 -0.012 
 
   (0.052) (-0.356) (-1.477) 
Return    0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 
   (0.413) (0.842) (-0.579) 
Volatility    0.174*** 0.125*** 0.107* 
 
   (10.380) (3.682) (1.896) 
Price    -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 
 
   (-11.102) (-5.773) (-4.555) 
Constant 0.037*** 0.045* -0.023 0.052*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 
 (3.793) (1.796) (0.511) (5.481) (5.182) (3.101) 
 
     
 
Observations 9,164 2,078 623 8,510 1,940 586 
Adjusted R-
squared 









Panel B: H-shares 
 H-shares 
Dep. Variable Percentage change of trading volumes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
1% drop 2% drop 3% drop 1% drop 2% drop 3% drop 
Short 0.004 0.008 -0.007 0.006 -0.002 -0.037** 
 
(0.713) (1.101) (-0.561) (0.842) (-0.175) (-2.110) 
Size 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 
 
(13.030) (9.143) (4.708) (19.499) (15.214) (8.586) 
TVt-1 -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.048*** 
 
(-25.748) (-17.660) (-10.752) (-28.627) (-21.307) (-12.744) 
Liquidity 0.579* -0.212 0.087 0.411 0.300 -0.022 
 
(1.872) (-0.599) (0.136) (1.116) (0.732) (-0.032) 
Liquidityt-1 1.305*** 0.664 -0.371 1.293*** 0.629 -0.848 
 
(3.663) (1.393) (-0.373) (3.021) (1.231) (-0.793) 
PB    -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 
 
   (-2.266) (1.312) (-1.267) 
STDROA    0.092 -0.036 -0.096 
 
   (0.774) (-0.249) (-0.316) 
leverage    -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.043*** 
 
   (-3.336) (-4.276) (-2.780) 
Return    0.004 0.003 0.014 
 
   (0.818) (0.646) (1.316) 
Volatility    0.271*** 0.273*** 0.240** 
 
   (6.761) (5.782) (2.452) 
Price 
   
-0.034*** -0.030*** -0.038*** 
 
   (-14.573) (-11.099) (-7.175) 
Constant 0.057*** 0.100*** 0.115*** 0.020 0.057*** 0.098** 
 
(3.384) (5.341) (3.570) (1.171) (2.711) (2.483) 
 
      
Observations 7,973 1,844 563 7,030 1,596 476 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.084 0.155 0.179 0.113 0.242 0.280 
 
Next, to make a more direct comparison, investors’ responses on days with market-wide 
and firm-specific negative information are examined. Trading volumes are used as an 
estimate. To capture days with market-wide negative information, a significant market 
index drop is used as a proxy (i.e., minimum 1% decrease in one day). Using equation 
(7), I compare the percentage change of trading volumes between shortable and non-
shortable shares (Table 6.11). Columns (1) and (4) test the relationship on days with at 




at least a 2% market return decrease and columns (3) and (6) test the relationship on days 
with at least a 3% reduction in market return. In the mainland Chinese market, the 
coefficient estimate of Short is significantly positive in market downturns, suggesting 
investors in the A-share market respond to market-wide negative news when they are 
allowed to short-sell. The coefficient estimate of Short becomes more pronounced when 
controlled for more firm-level characteristics (i.e., PB, STDROA, leverage, return, 
volatility and price) and on days with a larger decease in the market index. On the Hong 
Kong market, the coefficient estimate of Short is insignificant. This indicates that H-share 
traders do not short-sell stocks based on market-wide negative information unless there 
is a serious market index drop, which denotes a minimum 3% of the market index in one 
day.   
Since firm-specific information released by a company traded in two markets is the same, 
I conduct a paired t test to analyse trading volumes on days with firm-specific negative 
information. As shown in Table 6.12, I compare the trading volumes and the turnover 
using two samples. The first is a full sample including all shares. The second is a sub-
sample including shares that may be short-sold in the A- and H- share markets at the same 
time. I find that the trading volumes of A-shares are statistically significantly lower than 
their counterparts listed on the Hong Kong market on days with firm-specific negative 
information. The measure of turnover gives the same conclusion. These results further 
confirm my expectation that institutional investors on the Hong Kong market respond 
more to firm-specific negative information than do individual investors on the mainland 







Trading volumes and short-sale constraints on days with firm-specific negative news.  
This table reports the trading volume differences between A- and H-shares on days with firm-
specific negative news. TV_A is the trading volumes of A-shares, TV_H is the trading volumes 
of H-shares, TO_A is the turnover of A-shares, and TO_H is the turnover of H-shares. 
Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
All shares 
Trading volumes Turnover 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
TV_A 9.617 TO_A 0.004 
TV_H 9.713 TO_H 0.009 
T-test   -6.083*** T-test  -24.912*** 
 
Shortable Shares 
Trading volumes Turnover 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
TV_A 9.919 TO_A 0.003 
TV_H 10.023 TO_H 0.007 
T-test -4.700*** T-test -20.619*** 
 
The last set of robustness tests is to re-run model (5) with a full list of control variables 
(i.e., size, volatility, price, return, and turnover, price to book ratio, volatility of return on 
assets and leverage), but using alternative synchronicity measures indicated in 
methodology section 5.2.5. As displayed in Table 6.13, the return synchronicity values 
in columns (1), (2) and (3) are estimated by equations (8), (9) and (10), respectively. All 










Table 6.13  
Short-sale constrains and return synchronicity using alternative synchronicity measures. 
This table reports the regressions of stocks’ return synchronicity on short-sale constraints at the 
firm level. The regression model is as follows: 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the logistic transformation of return synchronicity for firm i in year t. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed, and zero otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  are the firm-level control variables, including firm size (Size), return volatility 
(Volatility), price (Price), annual returns (Return), turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), 
volatility of the return on assets (TDROA) and leverage (Leverage). The definition of variables 
is given in Appendix A. Observations is the number of observations, Adjusted R-squared is the 
adjusted R-squared value, and Year Fixed Effects are included (not reported). Superscripts *, **, 
and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 
from 2010 to 2014. 
 
Panel A: A-shares 
Dep Variables  SYNC_A  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Short 0.327*** 0.313*** 0.325*** 
 (3.462) (3.484) (3.454) 
Size 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 
 (4.057) (4.438) (3.998) 
Volatility -1.821 -1.529 -1.805 
 (-1.062) (-0.979) (-1.059) 
Price 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.153*** 
 (3.066) (3.285) (2.996) 
Return -0.351*** -0.346*** -0.351*** 
 (-2.953) (-3.010) (-2.958) 
Turnover -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 
 (-0.174) (-0.245) (-0.110) 
PB -0.047* -0.044* -0.047* 
 (-1.936) (-1.895) (-1.928) 
STDROA -7.161** -6.724** -7.237** 
 (-2.285) (-2.286) (-2.314) 
Leverage -0.356* -0.370** -0.350* 
 (-1.901) (-2.130) (-1.879) 
Constant -1.936*** -1.981*** -1.897*** 
 (-3.516) (-3.862) (-3.443) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 368 368 368 








Panel B: H-shares 
Dep Variables  SYNC_H  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Short -0.567*** -0.605*** -0.541*** 
 (-3.695) (-4.107) (-3.620) 
Size 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.292*** 
 (11.904) (12.596) (11.947) 
Volatility -2.357 -1.795 -2.069 
 (-1.539) (-1.255) (-1.410) 
Price 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 
 (2.667) (2.999) (2.666) 
Return -0.190 -0.239 -0.187 
 (-1.217) (-1.558) (-1.233) 
Turnover 0.118*** 0.132*** 0.112*** 
 (2.841) (3.197) (2.847) 
PB 0.004 0.011 0.007 
 (0.151) (0.428) (0.283) 
STDROA -3.316 -3.541 -3.451 
 (-0.822) (-0.992) (-0.869) 
Leverage -0.303 -0.23 -0.306 
 (-1.497) (-1.146) (-1.563) 
Constant -5.358*** -5.364*** -5.294*** 
 (-10.942) (-11.774) (-10.936) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 301 301 301 











6.5 Short-sale constraints and corporate governance  
A stronger corporate governance structure encourages better information disclosure (e.g., 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and 
Cohen, 2012), which leads to investors’ greater willingness to incorporate firm-specific 
information. Therefore, the quality of the corporate governance structure may contribute 
to the effects of short-sale constraints on investors’ willingness to impound firm-specific 
negative information. Specifically, A-share (H-share) investors trade more on market-
wide (firm-specific) information. I would thus expect an increased willingness to 
incorporate firm-specific negative information with a better corporate governance 
structure among H-share investors, but not A-shareholders.  
Table 6.14  
Descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables on an annual basis.  
SOE is a dummy variable if the company is state-owned, and otherwise zero. Indep is the percentage of 
independent members on board. Supervisory is the number of members on the supervisory board. 
Management is the size of management team. CEO_Chair is a dummy variable equal to one if CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Linktop10 is a dummy variable equal to one if the top ten 
shareholders are linked, and zero otherwise.  
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
SOE 0.432 0.411 0.434 0.390 0.280 0.175 0.108 0.087 0.063 0.056 
Indep 0.361 0.361 0.373 0.381 0.381 0.380 0.384 0.385 0.391 0.380 
Supervisory 4.763 4.813 5.016 5.046 5.014 5.053 4.963 5.035 5.105 4.907 
Management 7.395 7.854 8.813 8.369 8.406 8.671 9.038 9.233 9.256 8.907 
CEO_Chair 0.080 0.098 0.113 0.092 0.101 0.079 0.090 0.116 0.093 0.116 
Linktop10 0.407 0.306 0.426 0.481 0.484 0.286 0.472 0.407 0.395 0.419 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for corporate governance variables on an annual basis are 
summarized in Table 6.14. Before 2005, most cross-listed companies were state-owned. 
The stock split reform was carried out in April 2005 and has gradually restructured the 
companies into limited liability corporations. As indicated in the table, this proportion 




According to CSRC, listed firms are required to have one third of independent directors 
on the board. In my sample, the ratio of independent directors on the board (Indep) is 
roughly 36% for 2005 and has a small increase to 38% in 2014. The number of members 
on the supervisory board (Supervisory) is around five throughout the sample period. The 
average size of the management team (Management) is approximately eight. Around 10% 
of the companies have that CEO as chairman of the board. Approximately 40 per cent of 
the firms have the top 10 shareholders linked. Generally, the corporate governance 




Table 6.15  
Stock return synchronicity, short-sale constraints and corporate governance. 
This table reports the regression of stock return synchronicity on short-sale constraints with the interaction between short-sale constraints and the 
firm-specific corporate governance, and other firm-level control variables. The regression model is as follows: 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the logistic transformation of return synchronicity for firm i in year t. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to one if short-
selling is allowed, and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 are firm-level corporate governance variables, including a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
is a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and zero otherwise, the percentage of independent directors on the board (Indep), the number of members on 
the supervisory board (Supervisory), the size of the management team (Management), a dummy variable equal to one if CEO is also the chairman 
of the board (CEO_Chair ), and zero otherwise, a dummy variable equal to one if the top 10 shareholders are linked (Linktop10), and zero otherwise.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the firm-level control variables, including firm size( Size), return volatility (Volatility), price (Price), annual returns (Return), 
turnover (Turnover), price to book ratio (PB), volatility of the return on assets (TDROA) and leverage( Leverage). The definition of the variables 
is given in Appendix A. Observations is the number of observations, Adjusted R-squared is the adjusted R-squared value, and Year Fixed Effects 
are included (not reported). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 






Panel A: A-shares 
A-shares  
Dep. Variable SYNC_A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Short 0.270*** 0.278*** 0.171 0.244 0.438** 0.372 
 (2.808) (2.978) (0.409) (0.456) (2.050) (1.624) 
SOE -0.580** -0.542     
 (-2.072) (-1.619)     
Short*SOE 0.325 0.250     
 (0.820) (0.561)     
Indep   -0.333 -0.209   
   (-0.365) (-0.153)   
Short*Indep   0.366 0.180   
   (0.340) (0.123)   
Supervisory     0.042 0.030 
     (1.067) (0.628) 
Short*Supervisory     -0.026 -0.012 
     (-0.627) (-0.241) 
Size 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 
 (5.985) (4.464) (5.742) (4.365) (4.649) (3.558) 
Volatility -1.671 -1.117 -2.089** -1.496 -2.069** -1.480 
 (-1.612) (-0.789) (-2.029) (-0.977) (-2.017) (-0.959) 
Price 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
 (3.286) (3.300) (3.210) (3.176) (3.305) (3.261) 
Return -0.421*** -0.347*** -0.412*** -0.341*** -0.413*** -0.343*** 
 (-3.463) (-3.050) (-3.350) (-2.950) (-3.364) (-3.001) 
Turnover -0.017 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 -0.010 
 (-0.567) (-0.350) (-0.311) (-0.188) (-0.440) (-0.285) 




  (-2.004)  (-1.902)  (-1.903) 
STDROA  -6.034**  -6.815**  -6.416** 
  (-2.101)  (-2.320)  (-2.093) 
Leverage  -0.367**  -0.369**  -0.375** 
  (-2.096)  (-2.161)  (-2.176) 
Constant -2.332*** -1.940*** -2.200*** -1.837** -2.314*** -1.866*** 
 (-5.446) (-3.876) (-3.969) (-2.450) (-4.873) (-3.232) 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 368 368 366 366 366 366 
Adjusted  
R-squared 

























Dep. Variable SYNC_A 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Short 0.306 0.22 0.277*** 0.291*** 0.353*** 0.348*** 
 (1.515) (1.053) (3.021) (3.180) (3.087) (3.034) 
Management 0.001 -0.010    
 
 (0.030) (-0.493)    
 
Short*Management 0.000 0.011    
 
 (-0.007) (0.464)    
 
CEO_Chair   0.016 0.081  
 
   (0.095) (0.381)  
 
Short*CEO_Chair   0.244 0.144  
 
   (1.116) (0.604)  
 
Linktop10     0.015 -0.004 
     (0.118) (-0.031) 
Short_Linktop10     -0.223 -0.185 
     (-1.442) (-1.221) 
Size 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 
 (5.600) (4.301) (6.081) (4.533) (5.823) (4.564) 
Volatility -2.100** -1.508 -2.235** -1.66 -5.256*** -4.653*** 
 (-2.041) (-0.987) (-2.179) (-1.099) (-4.427) (-2.681) 
Price 0.156*** 0.161*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 
 (3.144) (3.310) (2.973) (2.975) (3.257) (3.145) 
Return -0.414*** -0.339*** -0.410*** -0.340*** -0.615*** -0.575*** 
 (-3.365) (-2.965) (-3.349) (-3.010) (-4.371) (-4.222) 
Turnover -0.011 -0.007 -0.015 -0.011 0.045 0.048 
 (-0.348) (-0.196) (-0.495) (-0.306) (1.239) (1.129) 
PB  -0.048**  -0.043*  -0.023 




STDROA  -6.814**  -6.836**  -4.711 
  (-2.309)  (-2.309)  (-1.632) 
Leverage  -0.355**  -0.364**  -0.269 
  (-2.068)  (-2.156)  (-1.414) 
Constant -2.318*** -1.858*** -2.354*** -1.957*** -1.994*** -1.828*** 
 (-5.258) (-3.460) (-5.491) (-3.811) (-3.866) (-3.038) 
      
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 366 366 365 365 284 284 











Panel B: H-shares 
H-shares  
Dep. variable SYNC_H 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Short -0.468*** -0.566*** 0.160 0.219 -0.39 -0.643 
 (-2.964) (-3.679) (0.143) (0.256) (-0.446) (-1.100) 
SOE 0.410 0.364     
 (0.445) (0.739)     
Short*SOE -0.432 -0.365     
 (-0.456) (-0.668)     
Indep   1.744 2.117   
   (0.581) (0.956)   
Short*Indep   -1.781 -2.230   
   (-0.585) (-0.954)   
Supervisory     0.056 0.027 
     (0.330) (0.252) 
Short*Supervisory     -0.009 0.021 
     (-0.051) (0.189) 
Size 0.278*** 0.293*** 0.280*** 0.294*** 0.255*** 0.269*** 
 (13.737) (12.225) (13.869) (12.519) (11.311) (10.505) 
Volatility -1.936* -1.582 -1.956 -1.504 -1.541 -1.201 
 (-1.664) (-1.148) (-1.633) (-1.072) (-1.321) (-0.852) 
Price 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.156*** 0.150*** 
 (3.538) (3.059) (3.531) (3.042) (3.829) (3.183) 
Return -0.212* -0.228 -0.205* -0.217 -0.238* -0.249* 
 (-1.722) (-1.526) (-1.655) (-1.469) (-1.943) (-1.663) 
Turnover 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.137*** 0.124*** 0.136*** 0.124*** 




PB  0.013  0.008  0.007 
  (0.527)  (0.308)  (0.265) 
STDROA  -3.694  -3.925  -2.82 
  (-1.094)  (-1.108)  (-0.739) 
Leverage  -0.251  -0.261  -0.256 
  (-1.285)  (-1.382)  (-1.298) 
Constant -5.270*** -5.281*** -5.928*** -6.035*** -5.213*** -5.050*** 
 (-13.301) (-11.423) (-4.932) (-6.667) (-5.415) (-6.614) 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 304 301 304 301 304 301 















Dep. variable SYNC_H 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Short -0.350 -0.572 -0.600*** -0.696*** -0.502*** -0.503*** 
 (-0.931) (-1.089) (-3.535) (-4.314) (-2.616) (-2.860) 
Management 0.005 -0.008     
 0.121 (-0.160)     
Short*Management -0.019 -0.003     
 (-0.452) (-0.049)     
CEO_Chair   -0.365 -0.342*   
   (-1.254) (-1.703)   
Short*CEO_Chair   0.535* 0.533**   
   (1.666) (2.257)   
Linktop10     -0.170 -0.047 
     (-0.562) (-0.187) 
Short_Linktop10     -0.008 -0.126 
     (-0.025) (-0.468) 
Size 0.283*** 0.294*** 0.281*** 0.299*** 0.301*** 0.306*** 
 13.768 12.845 13.728 11.908 13.024 11.924 
Volatility -2.150* -1.794 -2.369** -1.947 -3.102** -2.892* 
 (-1.816) (-1.320) (-2.010) (-1.396) (-2.284) (-1.717) 
Price 0.162*** 0.155*** 0.138*** 0.130*** 0.171*** 0.166*** 
 (3.753) (3.058) (3.326) (2.612) (3.612) (3.073) 
Return -0.208* -0.221 -0.206* -0.220 -0.484*** -0.501*** 
 (-1.696) (-1.459) (-1.680) (-1.486) (-3.332) (-2.792) 
Turnover 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.110** 0.103** 
 (3.359) (3.226) (3.354) (3.141) (2.317) (2.291) 




  (0.338)  (0.505)  (0.600) 
STDROA  -3.67  -4.236  -2.372 
  (-1.005)  (-1.176)  (-0.661) 
Leverage  -0.221  -0.297  -0.085 
  (-1.172)  (-1.511)  (-0.393) 
Constant -5.389*** -5.243*** -5.161*** -5.196*** -5.720*** -5.745*** 
 (-10.897) (-7.409) (-12.790) (-10.957) (-10.165) (-10.187) 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 304 301 302 299 237 235 




Table 6.15 reports the results from regression (11) with the interaction term between the 
short-sale constraints and firms’ corporate governance variables. Panel A presents the 
regression results for A-shares. The coefficient estimates of Short remain positive and 
statistically significant even after controlling for the corporate governance variables, 
suggesting that the effect of short-sale constraints on return synchronicity is partly 
independent of the firm-level information environment. I notice that none of the 
individual corporate governance factors and the intersection with short-sale constraints is 
statistically significant. This indicates that firm corporate structure is irrelevant in the 
asymmetric impact of positive and negative news on A-shares’ return synchronicity. 
These results can be explained by the evidence that individual investors in the mainland 
Chinese market short sell stock based on the market-wide negative information. 
Therefore, stronger or weaker firm-level corporate governance is not their main focus 
and thus would not influence their trading activity. Panel B presents the regression results 
for H-shares. Most coefficient estimates of Short remain negative and statistically 
significant even after controlling for the corporate governance variables. It is noteworthy 
that the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between CEO_Chair and Short is 
significantly positive, suggesting an decrease in the effect of short-sale on return 
synchronicity if the CEO is also chairman of the board. This is consistent with the 
argument that duality of CEO and chairman weakens the monitoring function (Grove, 
Patelli, and Victoravich, 2011) and results in fewer investors’ willing to incorporate firm 
specific information. A detailed interpretation is as follows. H-share investors short sell 
stocks based on firm-specific negative information. The duality of CEO and chairman, as 
a proxy for weaker corporate governance, discourages H-share investors’ trading activity 
on firm-specific negative information. As a result, the impact of short-sale constraints on 




not contribute significantly to the relationship between short-sale constraints and H-
shares’ return synchronicity. The insignificance of these corporate governance variables 
can be explained by the unique corporate governance features in China (Li, Brockman, 
and Zurbruegg, 2015). They point out that, in China, the effectiveness of the supervisory 
board still remains a question because the supervisory board comes into play only when 
there are suspicious irregular activities. Shareholders’ meetings are generally controlled 
by the large (controlling) shareholders, which weakens the supervisory board’s 
monitoring role. In summary, the supervisory board has weak power to perform its duty. 
In terms of independent directors on the board, their effectiveness is also in doubt. Xu 
and Lin (2016) provide several alternative explanations. First, the inside control 
problem31 makes it difficult for independent directors to play an independent role. Second, 
the proportion of independent directors is too low to challenge inside directors’ decisions. 
Third, the human resource market for independent directors is immature. Around 40 per 
cent are scholars who work for multiple companies. Based on these findings and 
discussion, it is crucial to reinforce better practice in corporate governance rather than 




                                                 













To the best of my knowledge, this research is the first attempt to examine the asymmetric 
impact of positive and negative information on return synchronicity, which occurs from 
a change in short-sale constraints. I explain the asymmetry by separately examining 
individual and institutional investors’ capabilities to impound firm-specific information 
as opposed to market-wide information, especially firm-specific negative information. I 
conduct a series of robustness tests on liquidity commonality and trading volumes to 
support my primary test. Finally, I examine the joint impact of corporate governance 
factors and short-sale constraints on stock return synchronicity. Using AH dual-listed 
shares from China’s unique capital market settings helps achieve these objectives. I 
collect data from a variety of sources, including DataStream, Thomson Reuters News 
Analytics (TRNA), and China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR). The 
trading related data are from the Datastream database, news related data are from TRNA 
and corporate governance data are from CSMAR.  
By investigating 86 dual-listed stocks traded on both the mainland Chinese and Hong 
Kong markets from January 2005 to December 2014, my empirical results support my 
hypotheses. First, H-shares present a significantly lower level of stock return 
synchronicity than their A-share counterparts. Since return synchronicity is inversely 
related to firm-specific information, it suggests that institutional investors are more 
capable of incorporating firm-specific information. Second, there is an asymmetric 
impact of optimistic and pessimistic information on return synchronicity in both the 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong markets. The magnitude of the difference is larger in 
the Hong Kong market. This implies that institutional investors are better able to 




compared with non-shortable shares, shortable shares present a significantly greater 
return synchronicity on the mainland Chinese market, whereas there is a smaller return 
synchronicity on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This suggests that individual 
(institutional) investors in the mainland Chinese (Hong Kong) market incorporate more 
market-wide (firm-specific) negative information into stock prices with the lifting of 
short-sale constraints. This argument is supported by several robustness tests. In the first 
test, I investigate the effect of short-sale constraints on stock liquidity commonality. 
Shortable shares’ liquidity commonality is larger (smaller) than non-shortable shares on 
the mainland Chinese (Hong Kong) market. In the second test, I compare the trading 
volumes on days with market-wide negative news. Shortable shares have greater trading 
volumes than non-shortable shares on the mainland Chinese market, but not on H-share 
market. Finally, I use a paired t test to compare the trading volumes of A- and H-share in 
times with firm-specific news. H-shares’ trading volumes are significantly larger than 
simultaneously traded A-shares. All these robustness tests confirm my interpretation. In 
addition, I investigate whether better corporate governance characteristics, measured by 
SOE component and several board characteristic variables, enhance or mitigate the 
impact of short-sale constraints on stock return synchronicity. Among the variables, only 
the duality of CEO and chairman mitigates the effect of short-selling on return 
synchronicity of H-shares, suggesting weak corporate governance discourages 
institutional investors from impounding firm-specific negative information.  
My findings make one major contribution to the existing return synchronicity literature 
by showing an asymmetric impact of good and bad news on return synchronicity. They 
also provide additional evidence to support the inverse relationship between the 
incorporation of firm-specific information and return synchronicity. More interestingly, 




institutional and individual investors. In addition, the results show how the firm-level 
information environment, together with short-sale constraints, influences return 
synchronicity. This provides some implications for policy regulators and company 
executives.  
My results may help policy makers draw some implications as follows. The lifting of 
short-sale constraints should be tailored according to market conditions (i.e., the 
composition of traders). Individual investors tend to short-sell stocks based on market-
wide negative information, which means they may overlook good firm-specific news 
released by a company. Therefore, regulators should be more cautious about the risk of 
relaxing short-sale constraints in markets with a large proportion of individual investors. 
Alternatively, the participation of institutional investors can help to facilitate the 
incorporation of firm-specific negative information and reduce return synchronicity. It is 
recommended more participation of institutional investors be encouraged. Importantly, 
for both authorities and company executives, it is suggested that better practice in 
corporate governance structure can help to facilitate firm-specific information and 












8 Appendixes  
Appendix A 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in the tables. 






Logistic transformation of R2 estimated from a firm’s daily stock 





Logistic transformation of R2 estimated from a firm’s daily stock 
bid-ask spread regressed on equally weighted A-share market and 
H-share market bid-ask spreads. 
Datastream 
Short-sale Short 
A dummy variable equal to one if short-selling is allowed, and zero 
otherwise 
 
Firm size Size Log of total assets Datastream 
Annual stock returns Return Annual stock returns Datastream 
Stock price                                    Price   Log of stock price                                                                            Datastream 
Stock return 
volatility                 
STD      Annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns       Datastream 
Liquidity Liquidity 
Twice the absolute value of the difference between the trading 
price and the midpoint of the bid and ask prices, which is then 





Variable Acronym Description 
Data 
sources 
Leverage Leverage Total liability/total assets Datastream 
Volatility of return 
on assets  
STDROA 
Volatility of return on assets over the last five quarters, including 
the current quarter 
Datastream 
Trading volumes                          TV Stock trading volumes                                                                 Datastream 
Turnover                                        TO Stock turnover                                                                              Datastream 
State owned 
enterprises 
SOE  State-owned enterprises CSMAR 
Independent 
directors 
Indep The percentage of independent directors on board CSMAR 
Supervisory board Supervisory The number of members on the supervisory board CSMAR 
Management team Management The size of management team CSMAR 
CEO & chairman  CEO_Chair 
A dummy variable equal to one if CEO is also the chairman of the 





A dummy variable equal to one if the top 10 shareholders are 


















1 CHINA VANKE CO., LTD 2 29/01/1991 2202 25/06/2014 K 
2 
CHINA INTERNATIONAL MARINE CONTAINERS (GROUP) CO., 
LTD 
39 08/04/1994 2039 19/12/2012 C 
3 ZTE CORPORATION 63 18/11/1997 763 09/12/2004 C 
4 
ZOOMLION HEAVY INDUSTRY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
CO., LTD. 
157 12/10/2000 1157 23/12/2010 C 
5 WEICHAI POWER CO., LTD. 338 30/04/2007 2338 11/03/2004 C 
6 SHANDONG CHENMING PAPER HOLDINGS LTD. 488 20/11/2000 1812 18/06/2008 C 
7 LIVZON PHARMACEUTICAL (GROUP) INC. 513 28/10/1993 1513 16/01/2014 C 
8 NORTHEAST ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. 585 13/12/1995 42 06/07/1995 C 
9 JINGWEI TEXTILE MACHINERY CO., LTD. 666 10/12/1996 350 02/02/1996 C 
10 SHANDONG XINHUA PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. 756 06/08/1997 719 31/12/1996 C 
11 ANGANG STEEL COMPANY LIMITED 898 25/12/1997 347 24/07/1997 C 
12 HISENSE KELON ELECTRICAL HOLDINGS COMPANY LIMITED 921 13/07/1999 921 23/07/1996 C 
13 XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE&TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD 2202 26/12/2007 2208 08/10/2010 C 














15 BYD CO., LTD 2594 30/06/2011 1211 31/07/2002 C 
16 DONGJIANG ENVIRONMENTAL COMPANY LIMITED 2672 26/04/2012 895 28/09/2010 C 
17 ZHEJIANG SHIBAO COMPANY LIMITED 2703 02/11/2012 1057 09/03/2011 C 
18 HUANENG POWER INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD 600011 06/12/2001 902 21/01/1998 D 
19 ANHUI EXPRESSWAY CO., LTD 600012 07/01/2003 995 13/11/1996 G 
20 CHINA MINSHENG BANKING CO., LTD. 600016 19/12/2000 1988 26/11/2009 J 
21 COSCO SHIPPING Energy Transportation Co., Ltd. 600026 23/05/2002 1138 11/11/1994 G 
22 HUADIAN POWER INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD. 600027 03/02/2005 1071 30/06/1999 D 
23 CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION 600028 08/08/2001 386 19/10/2000 B 
24 CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES CO., LTD 600029 25/07/2003 1055 31/07/1997 G 
25 CITIC SECURITIES CO., LTD 600030 06/01/2003 6030 06/10/2011 J 
26 CHINA MERCHANTS BANK CO., LTD 600036 09/04/2002 3968 22/09/2006 J 
27 CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES CO., LTD. 600115 05/11/1997 670 05/02/1997 G 
28 YANZHOU COAL MINING CO., LTD. 600188 01/07/1998 1171 01/04/1998 B 















GUANGZHOU BAIYUNSHAN PHARMACEUTICAL HOLDINGS 
COMPANY LIMITED 
600332 06/02/2001 874 30/10/1997 C 
31 JIANGXI COPPER CO., LTD. 600362 11/01/2002 358 12/06/1997 C 
32 JIANGSU EXPRESSWAY CO., LTD 600377 16/01/2001 177 27/06/1997 G 
33 SHENZHEN EXPRESSWAY CO., LTD 600548 25/12/2001 548 12/03/1997 G 
34 ANHUI CONCH CEMENT CO.,LTD 600585 7/02/2002 914 21/10/1997 C 
35 TSINGTAO BREWERY CO., LTD. 600600 27/08/1993 168 15/07/1993 C 
36 
CSSC OFFSHORE & MARINE ENGINEERING (GROUP) 
COMPANY LIMITED 
600685 28/10/1993 317 06/08/1993 C 
37 SINOPEC SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL CO., LTD. 600688 08/11/1993 338 26/07/1993 C 
38 NANJING PANDA ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 600775 18/11/1996 553 02/05/1996 C 
39 SHENJI GROUP KUNMING MACHINE TOOL CO.,LTD 600806 03/01/1994 300 07/12/1993 C 
40 MAANSHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. 600808 06/01/1994 323 03/11/1993 C 
41 HAITONG SECURITIES COMPANY LTD 600837 24/02/1994 6837 27/04/2012 J 
42 
BEIJING JINGCHENG MACHINERY ELECTRIC COMPANY 
LIMITED 
600860 06/05/1994 187 06/08/1993 C 
43 SINOPEC OILFIELD SERVICE CORPORATION 600871 11/04/1995 1033 29/03/1994 B 
44 
TIANJIN CAPITAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONGROUP 
COMPANY LIMITED 














45 DONGFANG ELECTRIC CORPORATION LIMITED 600875 10/10/1995 1072 06/06/1994 C 
46 LUOYANG GLASS CO., LTD. 600876 31/10/1995 1108 08/07/1994 C 
47 CHONGQING IRON & STEEL COMPANY LIMITED 601005 28/02/2007 1053 17/10/1997 C 
48 FIRST TRACTOR COMPANY LIMITED 601038 08/08/2012 38 23/06/1997 C 
49 CHINA SHENHUA ENERGY COMPANY LIMITED 601088 09/10/2007 1088 15/06/2005 B 
50 SICHUAN EXPRESSWAY COMPANY LIMITED 601107 27/07/2009 107 07/10/1997 G 
51 AIR CHINA LIMITED 601111 18/08/2006 753 15/12/2004 G 
52 CHINA RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION LIMITED 601186 10/03/2008 1186 13/03/2008 E 
53 GUANGZHOU AUTOMOBILE GROUP CO., LTD. 601238 29/03/2012 2238 30/08/2010 C 
54 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA LIMITED 601288 15/07/2010 1288 16/07/2010 J 
55 CHINA CNR CORPORATION LIMITED 601299 29/12/2009 6199 22/05/2014 C 
56 PING AN INSURANCE (GROUP) COMPANY OF CHINA, LTD. 601318 01/03/2007 2318 24/06/2004 J 
57 BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS CO., LTD. 601328 15/05/2007 3328 23/06/2005 J 
58 GUANGSHEN RAILWAY COMPANY LIMITED 601333 22/12/2006 525 14/05/1996 G 














60 CHINA RAILWAY GROUP LIMITED. 601390 03/12/2007 390 07/12/2007 E 
61 INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LIMITED 601398 27/10/2006 1398 27/10/2006 J 
62 BEIJING NORTH STAR COMPANY LIMITED 601588 16/10/2006 588 14/05/1997 K 
63 ALUMINUM CORPORATION OF CHINA LIMITED 601600 30/04/2007 2600 12/12/2001 C 
64 CHINA PACIFIC INSURANCE (GROUP) CO., LTD. 601601 25/12/2007 2601 23/12/2009 J 
65 SHANGHAI PHARMACEUTICALS HOLDING CO.,LTD. 601607 24/03/1994 2607 20/05/2011 F 
66 METALLURGICAL CORPORATION OF CHINA LTD. 601618 21/09/2009 1618 24/09/2009 E 
67 CHINA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED 601628 09/01/2007 2628 18/12/2003 J 
68 GREAT WALL MOTOR COMPANY LIMITED 601633 28/09/2011 2333 15/12/2003 C 
69 ZHENGZHOU COAL MINING MACHINERY GROUP CO., LTD 601717 03/08/2010 564 05/12/2012 C 
70 SHANGHAI ELECTRIC GROUP COMPANY LIMITED 601727 05/12/2008 2727 28/04/2005 C 
71 CRRC CORPORATION LIMITED 601766 18/08/2008 1766 21/08/2008 C 
72 CHINACOMMUNICATIONSCONSTRUCTIONCOMPANYLIMITED 601800 09/03/2012 1800 15/12/2006 E 
73 CHINA OILFIELD SERVICES LIMITED 601808 28/09/2007 2883 20/11/2002 B 














75 PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED 601857 05/11/2007 857 07/04/2000 B 
76 COSCO SHIPPING DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD 601866 12/12/2007 2866 16/06/2004 G 
77 DALIAN PORT (PDA) CO., LTD 601880 06/12/2010 2880 28/04/2006 G 
78 CHINA COAL ENERGY COMPANY LIMITED 601898 01/02/2008 1898 19/12/2006 B 
79 ZIJIN MINING GROUP CO. LTD 601899 25/04/2008 2899 23/12/2003 B 
80 COSCO SHIPPING HOLDINGS CO. LTD 601919 26/06/2007 1919 30/06/2005 G 
81 CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK CORPORATION 601939 25/09/2007 939 27/10/2005 J 
82 BANK OF CHINA LIMITED 601988 05/07/2006 3988 01/06/2006 J 
83 DATANG INTERNATIONAL POWER GENERATION CO. LTD 601991 20/12/2006 991 21/03/1997 D 
84 BBMG CORPORATION 601992 01/03/2011 2009 29/07/2009 C 
85 CHINA CITIC BANK CORPORATION LTD 601998 27/04/2007 998 27/04/2007 J 



















Short-sale details for each stock from 2010 to 2014 
No. Name  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 A       30 A No No No Yes Yes 59 A  No No Yes Yes 
 H     Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H  No Yes Yes Yes 
2 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 31 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 60 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H   No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 32 A No No No No No 61 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 33 A No No No No No 62 A No No Yes No No 
 H No Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes No No Yes 




No. Name  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 A No No No No No 35 A No No Yes Yes Yes 64 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7 A No No No Yes Yes 36 A No No No No No 65 A No No Yes Yes Yes 
 H     Yes  H Yes Yes Yes No Yes  H  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 A No No No No No 37 A No No No No Yes 66 A No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H No No No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
9 A No No No No   38 A No No No No No 67 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H No No No No Yes  H No No No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10 A No No No No No 39 A No No No No No 68 A  No No Yes Yes 
 H No No No No No  H No No No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
11 A Yes Yes Yes No No 40 A No No No No No 69 A No No Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H   No No No 
12 A No No No No Yes 41 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 70 A No No Yes No No 
 H No No No No No  H   No Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
13 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 42 A No No No No No 71 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H No No No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
14 A No No No Yes Yes 43 A No No No No No 72 A   No Yes Yes 
 H No Yes No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
15 A  No No Yes Yes 44 A No No No No Yes 73 A No No Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H No Yes Yes No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
16 A   No No No 45 A No No Yes Yes Yes 74 A No No Yes Yes Yes 
 H No No No Yes No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H    No Yes 
17 A   No No No 46 A No No No No No 75 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H No No No No No  H No No No No No  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
18 A No No No Yes Yes 47 A No No No Yes Yes 76 A No No Yes Yes Yes 




No. Name  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 No. Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
19 A No No No No No 48 A   No Yes Yes 77 A No No No No No 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
20 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 49 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 78 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
21 A No No No No No 50 A No No No No No 79 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
22 A No No No Yes Yes 51 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 80 A Yes Yes Yes No No 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
23 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 52 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 81 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
24 A No No Yes Yes Yes 53 A   No No Yes 82 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
25 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 54 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 83 A No No No Yes Yes 
 H  No Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
26 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 55 A       84 A  No No Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H     Yes  H No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
27 A No No Yes Yes Yes 56 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 85 A No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
28 A No No Yes Yes Yes 57 A Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 86 A   No No No 
 H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
29 A No No Yes Yes Yes 58 A No No No Yes Yes        
  H     No No Yes   H Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes               
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